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EMERGENCIES END EVENTUALLY: HOW TO 
BETTER ANALYZE HUMAN RIGHTS 
RESTRICTIONS SPARKED BY THE 
COVID-19 PANDEMIC UNDER THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 




On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the novel 
coronavirus (“COVID-19”) a pandemic, but even before the official declara-
tion, UN member states began implementing emergency measures aimed at
curbing its spread.
1
Restricting travelers from countries with high infection 
rates; preventing inter- and intra-state movement; quarantines; surveillance 
using mobile telephone data; contact tracing digital apps; stay-at-home-
orders; limits on the number of people assembling in one place and other 
restrictions on public gatherings have all been heralded as important tools 
for bringing the global pandemic under control.
2
But at the same time, the 
∗ President, UNHR Geneva, an NGO dedicated to leveling the UN playing field, and 
Lecturer, U. California-Berkeley Law School. Former U.S. State Department attorney and 
diplomat, 1996-2017. Michigan Law School, JD, 1991, U. Michigan, MA (Law & World Pol-
itics), 1991, Stanford University, BA, 1988.
** Michigan Law School, JD, 2020, U. Michigan, BA (Women’s Studies), 2016, For-
mer UNHR Legal Fellow at the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations in 
Geneva.
1. See, e.g., COVID-19 Civic Freedom Tracker, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., 
https://www.icnl.org/covid19tracker/ (last accessed Sept. 30, 2020) (documenting government 
responses to the pandemic that affect civic freedoms and human rights, focusing on emergen-
cy laws) [hereinafter COVID-19 Tracker]. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law 
notes regarding the methodology of the tracker that “[w]hile the Tracker seeks to represent all 
countries’ responses to the pandemic, it reflects only the information that we have collected or 
received. The absence of an entry for a particular country does not mean that country has not 
taken measures that affect rights and freedoms.” Methodology: COVID-19 Civic Freedom 
Tracker, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., https://www.icnl.org/methodology-covid-19-
civic-freedom-tracker (last visited Oct. 1, 2020). We use the Tracker in this article to highlight 
trends in governments’ response and recognize that the Tracker my not be completely com-
prehensive for all measures taken by states in response to COVID-19 that may impact civic 
freedoms.
2. See World Health Organization, COVID-19 Strategy Update, 11 (Apr. 14, 2020); 
see also Coronavirus Restrictions in Each State, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 20, 2020), 
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use of these measures raises important questions of international human 
rights, including those related to states’ compliance with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR” or “the Covenant”). The 
ICCPR recognizes the governmental need for emergency health measures 
which may infringe human rights but does so while establishing crucial 
safeguards, so emergency measures do not permanently erode human rights 
protections.
3
In particular, Article 4 of the ICCPR provides that states 
should notify the UN Secretary-General if they intend to derogate from their 
international human rights obligations because of a crisis.
4
This derogation 
power, however, is subject to the satisfaction of several conditions, includ-
ing the notification requirement.
5
Surprisingly, six months into the pandem-
ic only 21 countries have issued notices of intent to derogate in relation to 
their COVID-19 measures.
6
This article analyzes the ICCPR standards that apply to emergency reg-
ulation in times of public health crisis and the tangled morass of legal tests 
that have been used to balance human rights and emergency restrictions. 
Under the Covenant a state that intends to restrict a right due to COVID-19
should follow one of three pathways: notify of the intent to derogate; issue a 
reservation, understanding or declaration; or assert that the limitation is jus-
tified because the right at issue is limited and on balance, the limitation is 
permitted by the language of the ICCPR.
7
We argue that in the COVID-19
emergency, derogation best protects human rights and the treaty structure, 
by providing opportunities for oversight and ensuring the end of emergency 
restrictions after the crisis subsides. Certainly, states should issue notices of 
derogation more often than the handful that have been received by the UN 
https://www.npr.org/series/847328455/coronavirus-restrictions-in-each-state (last visited Oct. 
1, 2020) (listing tools deployed or eased in U.S. states).
3. See Emergency Measures and COVID-19: Guidance, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”], (2020), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Events/Emergency
Measures_COVID19.pdf [hereinafter Emergency Measures]; see also Diego S. Silva & Max-
well J. Smith, Commentary, Limiting Rights and Freedoms in the Context of Ebola and Other 




4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
5. Id. art. 4(2).
6. See, e.g., Chapter IV. Human Rights: 4. International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights,  U.N. TREATY COLLECTION: STATUS OF TREATY DATABASES [hereinafter Dero-
gation Notification], https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_
no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 1, 2020). This article focuses on the initial 
six months of the pandemic, beginning when it was declared by the World Health Organiza-
tion on March 11, 2020 through September 11, 2020.
7. ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 4(3), 51(2).
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Secretary-General six months into the COVID-19 pandemic.
8
Failure to no-
tify of a derogation suggests that states are (a) ignoring the International 
Human Rights Law (“IHRL”) implications of their COVID-19-related 
emergency measures like travel restrictions, quarantines, restrictions on
group activity and surveillance, (b) acting under substantive portion of Arti-
cle 4 while ignoring the procedural requirements, or (c) assessing that given 
the limited nature of these rights under the ICCPR, no derogation is neces-
sary.
The first half of this article addresses the harms flowing from these 
three possibilities. The second half of this article looks in particular at the 
third of these possibilities, a limitations analysis, and considers how it may 
have been applied by states in their restrictions of three ICCPR rights: free-
dom of movement, privacy rights, and freedom of assembly.  States rarely 
explain their thinking under a limitations analysis, making it difficult to de-
termine when a limitations analysis was used or by contrast when states ig-
nored IHRL in their rush to impose COVID-19-related restrictions.  The ar-
ticle then analyzes the harm from this uncertainty about how states are 
justifying COVID-19-related restrictions and the potential damage from in-
definitely restricting key rights under the ICCPR’s limitations analysis. 
While ignoring IHRL is damaging, the alternative—assessing that emergen-
cy measures are justified on balance and not a rights infringement at all —
may be worse. If states assess that emergency measures are justified because 
the underlying rights are themselves limited, the processes for restoring lib-
erties and repealing excessive measures at the end of the emergency may 
not be followed. This possibility suggests that restrictions on travel against 
groups considered politically or socially undesirable, deployment of new 
surveillance systems that impede privacy, blocking of public assembly and 
democratic protest, and other human rights infringements caused by 
COVID-19-related measures may linger long after the virus itself.
Finally, this article questions whether traditional tests remain adequate 
for analyzing potential violations of three types of ICCPR rights in particu-
lar which contain a limitations clause: freedom of movement under Article 
12,
9
privacy rights under Article 17,
10
and freedom of assembly under Arti-
cle 21.
11
The ICCPR’s language in Articles 12, 17, and 21 has been boiled 
down by the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comments and sec-
ondary sources like the Siracusa Principles into broad concepts of legality,
8. Compare Derogation Notification, supra note 6 (showing that few states have is-
sued formal notices of derogation), with COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (showing that most 
states have enacted emergency measures in response to COVID-19). The COVID-19 Tracker 
is a collaboration of the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, the European Center for 
Not-for-Profit Law and the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism.
9. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 12.
10. Id. art. 17.
11. Id. art. 21.
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necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination.
12
We use our particular 
perch in Geneva to offer updated factors that states should consider in bal-
ancing COVID-19-related restrictions with limited human rights. These fac-
tors often build on the work of UN Special Rapporteurs and civil society 
and might be considered by the Human Rights Committee in updating its 
General Comments. Our proposals and proposed best practices for better 
balancing COVID-19-related emergency measures with human rights, as 
well as for how to remove restrictions once the COVID-19 crisis ends, in-
clude:
• improving the link between legal, technical and medical 
knowledge in crafting restrictions and considering less restric-
tive alternatives;
• ensuring an end date to restrictions either through derogation or 
the proportionality prong of a limitation analysis;
• considering the specific disease prevention phase and local 
conditions of the virus;
• prioritizing exercise of rights necessary in a democratic socie-
ty;
• focusing on the availability of alternatives, especially online al-
ternatives, for exercising rights temporarily limited during pub-
lic health emergencies; and
• seeking technological solutions to minimize damages cause by 
limitations, such as using digital contact tracing, deploying  
privacy-protecting technologies, or offering the option of 
online assemblies.
In sum, well-meaning but poorly considered restrictions in the name of 
combatting COVID-19 threaten to undermine hard-won human rights pro-
tections and may, in fact, erode important elements of IHRL as a result of 
overreaching implementation or a lack of rigorous analysis in how the re-
strictions are put and kept in place.
II. BACKGROUND: THE ICCPR, ESCAPE MECHANISMS, INTERNATIONAL 
HEALTH REGULATIONS, AND THE HISTORY OF DEROGATIONS IN
TIMES OF CRISIS
A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The ICCPR was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 
December 16, 1966, and entered into force on March 23, 1976. To date, 173 
parties have ratified the Covenant.
13
Six additional countries, including Chi-
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
13. Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM RTS,
[“OHCHR”] https://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited May 18, 2020) (searching “International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”).
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na, have signed but not ratified it.
14
As one of the core UN human rights 
treaties, the Covenant, translates the negative rights in the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights into a binding treaty.
15
Based on the inherent dignity 
of the person, the treaty seeks to promote conditions within states for the en-
joyment of civil and political rights.
16
Substantively, the Covenant enshrines rights to physical integrity, liber-
ty and security of person, procedural fairness and rights of the accused, in-
dividual liberties, and political rights.
17
Mechanically, Article 28 of the 
Covenant tasks the Human Rights Committee with monitoring states’ com-
pliance with the ICCPR.
18
Comprised of independent human rights experts, 
the Committee assesses compliance based on reports submitted by the 
member usually every four years and issues findings based on the country’s
performance.
19
In addition, the Human Rights Committee periodically issues 
General Comments providing interpretations of the treaty obligations.
20
Likewise, the Siracusa Principles have become an important secondary 
source analyzing and interpreting the ICCPR. Codified in 1985, following a 
conference hosted by the American Association of the International Com-
mittee of Jurists in 1984, the Siracusa Principles are a significant attempt at 
harmonizing principles on limitation and derogation in the ICCPR.
21
While 
neither the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee nor the Si-
racusa Principles are legally binding, both provide soft law influence and 
guidance over the treaty text.
22
14. Id.
15. See Human Rights Law, UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/en/sections
/universal-declaration/human-rights-law/index.html (last visited May 18, 2020).
16. ICCPR, supra note 4, pmbl.
17. See generally id.
18. Id. art. 28.
19. Human Rights Committee, OHCHR, last visited May 18, 2020), available at
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx.
20. Id.
21. UN Econ. & Soc. Council, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Deroga-
tion Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1985/4 (Sept. 28, 1984) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
22. See Lottie Lane, The Horizontal Effect of International Human Rights Law in Prac-
tice, 5 EUR. J. COMP. L. & GOVERNANCE 5, 11 (2018) (commenting on the nature of the Gen-
eral Comments); see also Tracy Slagle, Mehdi Ben Youssef, Golda Calonge & Yanis Ben 
Amor, Lessons from Africa: Developing a Global Human Rights Framework for Tuberculosis 
Control and Prevention, 14 BMC INT’L. HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (2014) (commenting on 
the nature of the Siracusa Principles); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 31, 32, 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) (stating that if the ordinary meaning 
of terms within a treaty cannot be interpreted based on the object and purpose of the treaty, 
supplementary means of interpretation may be used).
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B. Escape Mechanisms
Many international human rights treaties contemplate the possibility 
that governments might need to take special measures in a time of crisis.
23
The ICCPR contains several escape mechanisms that allow states to restrict 
rights enshrined in the treaty’s text while remaining in compliance with the 
treaty itself. Article 4 of the ICCPR provides that state parties to the Cove-
nant may derogate from certain provisions of the treaty in times of emer-
gency, but places restrictions on the circumstances and rights from which 
derogation is permitted.
24
Other substantive rights within the treaty contain a 
limitation clause acknowledging that the right is not absolute and provides 
member states the ability to undertake a balancing analysis.
25
Outside of the 
treaty text, member states may have issued a reservation, understanding, or 
declaration at the time of ratification that can redefine or qualify the scope 
of their obligations.
26
1. Article 4 Derogation
Article 4 of the Covenant provides the public emergency provision in 





prescribed in the treaty.
29
It seeks to strike a balance between uphold-
ing the protection of human rights and maintaining the governmental order 
needed to guarantee those rights.
30
Substantively, for a state to implement Article 4, there must be a public 
emergency that both “threatens the life of the nation” and is “officially pro-
claimed,” necessitating a derogation.
31
The Siracusa Principles provide addi-
tional guidance about what constitutes a public emergency which “threatens 
23. See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer & Christopher J. Fariss, Emer-
gency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties, 65 INT’L ORG. 673, 
674 (20111); see also Emergency Measures supra note 3.
24. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4.
25. Dominic McGoldrick, The Interface of Between Public Emergency Powers and 
International Law, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 380, 383 (2014); see Silva & Smith supra note 3,
at 53.
26. Eric Chung, The Judicial Enforceability and Legal Effects of Treaty Reservations, 
Understandings, and Declarations, 126 YALE L.J. 170, 173 (2016); Jack Goldsmith, The Un-
exceptional U.S. Human Rights RUDs, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 311, 312 (2005).
27. Scott P. Sheeran, Reconceptualizing States of Emergency Under International Hu-
man Rights Law: Theory, Legal Doctrine, and Politics, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 491, 507 (2013).
28. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
29. Id. art. 4(1).
30. Sheeran supra note 27 at 492 (2013); McGoldrick, supra note 25 at 411.
31. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(1); Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Com-
ment 29 art. 4, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General 
Comment No. 29] (stating “[t]he restoration of a state of normalcy where full respect for the 
Covenant can again be secured must be the predominant objective of a State party derogating 
from the Covenant”).
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the life of the nation” stating that an emergency must 1) be “actual or immi-
nent”; 2) “affect[s] the whole of the population and either the whole or part 
of the territory of the State”; and 3) “threaten[s] the physical integrity of the 
population, the political independence or the territorial integrity of the State 
or the existence or basic functioning of institutions indispensable to ensure 
and project the rights recognized in the Covenant.”
32
The Human Rights Committee in its General Comments also articulates 
a proportionality requirement, noting that measures derogating from the 
Covenant must be “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,” and 
occur in the presence of an emergency.
33
Finally, the Covenant requires that 
any derogation measure cannot be discriminatory based on race, color, sex, 
language, religion or social origin and measures may not be inconsistent 
with other obligations under international law.
34
Therefore, derogations in a 
time of public emergency are subject to the principles of necessity, propor-
tionality, non-discrimination, and the requirement of compliance with obli-
gations under international law.35
Procedurally, Article 4 also contains a notification requirement that 
obliges state parties to “immediately” inform other parties through the UN 
Secretary-General, stating the provisions from which they are derogating, 
making clear their reasoning, and providing an additional communication 
when the derogations are terminated.
36
This notification requirement acts as 
a safeguard by providing international oversight of compliance, discourag-
ing member states from abusing emergency power.
37
It also helps ensure 
derogations do not continue after the emergency by requiring the state to 
communicate when the derogation is terminated and provide notification if a 
state of emergency is extended.
38
A state party that fails to make immediate 
notification to the Secretary-General of derogation is in breach of its Article 
4 obligation. The Human Rights Committee has stressed the importance of 
notification on several occasions as more than a formality.
39
However, the 
32. Siracusa Principles supra note 21, § II.A.
33. General Comment No. 29, supra note 31,  ¶ 4; see also Tom R. Hickman, Between 
Human Rights and the Rule of Law: Indefinite Detention and the Derogation Model of Consti-
tutionalism, 68 MOD. L. REV. 656, 665 (2005) (arguing that the “strictly required” standard 
found in Article 4 is more demanding proportionality standard than the proportionality stand-
ard found in the limitation clauses).
34. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
35. See Emergency Measures, supra note 3; see also Adina Ponta, Human Rights Law 
in the Time of Coronavirus, 24 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.asil.org
/insights/volume/24/issue/5/human-rights-law-time-coronavirus.
36. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3).
37. General Comment No. 29, supra note 31,  ¶ 17.
38. Id.
39. McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 422 (citing U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.469, ¶ 19 (El 
Salvador) and U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.355, ¶ 24 (Uruguay)).
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Committee has not gone so far as to state that failure to notify would invali-
date an otherwise legal derogation.
40
2. Limitation Clauses
The ICCPR explicitly limits certain rights and allows them to be in-
fringed, often for reasons of public health. For these rights, some restrictions 
may be implemented based solely on the limited nature of the right. Clauses 
qualifying the nature of liberties under the ICCPR recognize that certain 
rights are not absolute and that the state may have a legitimate interest in 
balancing the individual rights at stake with other rights or interests of the 
society, including public health or public order.
41
Unlike derogation under 
Article 4, justifying an emergency measure because of the limited nature of 
the right being infringed upon does not require a declared public emergen-
cy.
42
When restrictions of rights are based on one of the ICCPR’s limitation 
clauses, no notification procedures or additional oversight is required.
43
In 
this way, states restricting rights under a limitations clause can escape legal 
scrutiny, avoid clear time limits on the restrictions imposed, and the ensuing 
damage to human rights could continue indefinitely.
44
Five articles of the ICCPR expressly provide that public health needs 
can justify limitations on the rights articulated by those articles. As demon-
strated below the language regarding public health exceptions varies for 
each of these rights based on the language of their respective ICCPR arti-
cles:
Article 12 sets forth the right to freedom of movement within a 
country, the right to leave any country, and the right to choose 
one’s own residence.
45
Section 3 explicitly states the limitations on 
freedom of movement:
The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any re-
strictions except those which are provided by law, are neces-
sary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), 
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, 
40. Id. at 423 (citing U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SR.355, ¶ 24 (Uruguay) & Silva case, U.N. 
Doc A/36/40, 130).
41. Id.
42. See id at 383 (stating that limitations can be permanent); Ponta, supra note 35 (stat-
ing “[e]ven in “ordinary times,” limitations on non-absolute rights or freedoms are permissi-
ble”).
43. Compare ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3) with ICCPR, supra note 4, art.12(3).
44. McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 383 (stating that limitations can be permanent).
45. ICCPR, supra note 4, art.12.
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and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant.
46
Section 4 of the Article then provides that “no one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of the right to enter his own country.”
47
As such, Article 12 con-
tains two separate standards for limiting freedom of movement.
48
Article 18 encompasses the right to freedom of religion.49 The right may 
be limited “subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms of others.”
50
Article 19 provides the right to freedom of expression, including the 
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds.
51
The article explicitly states that these rights may be “subject to certain re-
strictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are neces-
sary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protec-
tion of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health 
or morals.”
52
Article 21 provides the right of peaceful assembly.53 With regard to lim-
itations, it states:
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other 
than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are nec-
essary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or 
public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public 
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of oth-
ers.
54
Article 22 provides the right of freedom of association and also sets 
forth specific limits:
“No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other 
than those which are prescribed by law and which are necessary in 
a democratic society in the interests of national security or public 
46. Id. art. 12(3).
47. Id. art. 12(4).
48. See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 27 art. 12 ¶¶ 11, 21, 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999) [hereinafter General Comment No. 27].
49. ICCPR, supra note 4, art.18. In the second half of this article, scope and space limi-
tations prevented us from analyzing restrictions on freedom of religion, expression and asso-
ciation but the same concerns and analysis with respect to limited rights that we posit could 
also apply to these rights.
50. Id.
51. Id. art. 19.
52. Id. art. 19(3).
53. Id. art. 21.
54. Id.
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safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public health 
or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
55
In addition, Article 17 of the ICCPR on privacy provides the freedom 
from “unlawful or arbitrary interference with one’s privacy, family, home or 
correspondence.”
56
Article 17 does not explicitly mention limitations on 
these rights for reasons of public health, but privacy is a limited right be-
cause the Article expressly provides for freedom from “unlawful or arbitrary 
interference,” not from any interference.
57
a. Standards for Judging Limitations
While the text of the ICCPR provides inconsistent standards for when a 
limitation on substantive rights is justified, the General Comments of the 
Human Rights Committee and the Siracusa Principles, among other second-
ary sources, propose to harmonize standards around the principles of legali-
ty, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination.
Legality: The limitation clauses of Articles 12(3), 18, 19, 21, and 22 all 
contain language that reference legality
58
Articles 12(3) and 19 state that 
limitations must be “provided by law,” Article 21 states “in conformity with 
law,” and Articles 18 and 22 state “prescribed by law.”
59
General Comment 
37 explicitly sets out that “in conformity with law” and “provided by law”
have the same effect in creating a legality requirement.
60
The Siracusa Prin-
ciples separately expand on the phrase “prescribed by law” defining it as 
“provided for by national law of general application which is consistent 
with the Covenant and is in force at the time the limitation is applied.”
61
While the Siracusa Principles do not develop any of the other legality for-
mulations,
62
the definition does not appear to go beyond the general re-
quirement of legality, nor has there been any debate around its use in the 
Travaux Préparatoires.
63
Additionally, in General Comment 22 on Freedom 
55. Id. art. 22(2).
56. Id. art. 17(1).
57. Id.; see ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., NECESSARY & PROPORTIONATE:
INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO 
COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE, (May 2014) 18–19, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents
/Issues/Privacy/ElectronicFrontierFoundation.pdf.
58. ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 12, 18–19, 21–22.
59. Id.
60. Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 37 art. 21, ¶ 39 , U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/37 (July 23, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC
Article21.aspx [hereinafter General Comment No. 37]
61. 61. Siracusa Principles, supra note 21 at § B.i.
62. Id.
63. See Rep. of the Comm’n on Human Rights, 8th Sess., Apr. 14-June 14, 1952, U.N. 
Doc. E/2256 https://hr-travaux.law.virginia.edu/document/iccpr/e2256/nid-119 [hereinafter 
Travaux Préparatoires]; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 22,
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of Religion, the Committee elaborates on the legality requirement stating, 
“[l]imitations imposed must be established by law. . .”, suggesting that “pre-
scribed by law” should be interpreted similarly to legality requirements in 
the other Covenant Articles.
64
In  its most recent reports on Italy and the 
United States,  the Human Rights Committee confirmed that limitations to 
Article 17, privacy rights, must conform to the principle of legality.
65
Some dispute exists about whether an administrative regulation or ex-
ecutive order meets the requirements of being “prescribed by law” under the 
ICCPR principle of legality. Nowak argues in his Commentaries on the 
ICCPR that “mere administrative provisions are insufficient” to meet the 
legality standard, apparently relying on a hierarchy of laws analysis that a 
regulation does not rise to sufficient level to place substantive limits on a 
treaty provision.
66
Others have disagreed, contending that an Executive Or-
der or administrative regulation, properly passed and appropriately based on 
delegated authority, remains lawful even if it potentially limits a treaty 
right.
67
The difference need not concern us here. As of September 2020, on-
ly about thirteen percent of over 323 COVID-19-restricting measures doc-
umented by a leading civil society/UN database (“COVID-19 Tracker”)
were adopted by legislation; the remaining measures were authorized by ex-
ecutive or administrative order or practice.
68
Given the reality that most 
states have imposed limitations through executive or administrative actions, 
it would arbitrarily cut short this article’s analysis to overlook the dozens of 
restrictions passed by executive or administrative action because they fail 
Nowak’s test of legality.
69
Our primary concern remains that states should 
more rigorously analyze the impact of their COVID-related restrictions on 
key ICCPR rights.
Necessity and Proportionality: All five of the limitation clauses from 
the ICCPR which single out public health include the phrase “necessary” in 
describing the grounds justifying a limitation on those rights.
70
The Siracusa 
art. 32 (stating that if the ordinary meaning of terms within a treaty cannot be interpreted 
based on the object and purpose of the treaty in conformity with art. 31, supplementary means 
including the preparatory work of the treaty may be used to determine meaning).
64. See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 22 art. 18 ¶ 8, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 (Jul. 30, 1993) [hereinafter General Comment No. 22].
65. See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Concluding Observations on the Fourth 
Periodic Report of the United States of America ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 
(Apr. 23, 2014); Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Concluding Observations on the Sixth 
Periodic Report of Italy ¶ 37, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/ITA/CO/6 (May 1, 2020).
66. MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 270 (2d ed. 2005).
67. Id.
68. COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (comparing by “Type” that only 43 of over 323 
measures were authorized by law).
69. See, e.g., id.
70. ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 12, 18–19, 21–22.
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Principles expand further on “necessary” stating that it implies that a limita-
tion:
(a) is based on one of the grounds justifying limitations recognized 
by the relevant article of the Covenant,
(b) responds to a pressing public or social need,
(c) pursues a legitimate aim, and
(d) is proportionate to that aim.
71
The Siracusa Principles also state that “[a]ny assessment as to the ne-
cessity of a limitation shall be made on objective considerations” and that “a
state shall use no more restrictive means than are required for the achieve-
ment of the purpose of the limitation.”
72
The General Comments affirm that 







and Freedom of 
Assembly.
76
The application of these tests to Article 17’s Right to Privacy is more 
complicated. Because Article 17 protects from “unlawful” interference with 
privacy, the legality test is incorporated in the Article’s terms. But the anal-
ysis of necessity and proportionality is more roundabout. With respect to 
privacy, General Comment 16 of the Human Rights Committee defines non-
arbitrary interference with privacy as (1) consistent with the provisions, 
aims, and objectives of the ICCPR and (2) “reasonable in the particular cir-
cumstances.”
77
This test from General Comment 16 is further refined in the 
UN Human Rights Committee opinion in Van Hulst v. Netherlands to en-
compass the tests of necessity and proportionality found in the other clauses, 
and to ask whether the restricting measure has a legitimate aim.
78
The UN 
Special Rapporteur on Combatting Terrorism has similarly concluded that a 
limitations analysis under Article 17 should meet the requirements of Gen-
eral Comment 27.
79
Of General Comment 27’s several requirements, the 
most pertinent state:
71. Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, § I.A.10.
72. Id., § I.A.11.
73. General Comment No. 27, supra note 48, ¶ 16.
74. Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 34 art.19 para. 22, U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment No. 34].
75. General Comment No. 22, supra note 64, ¶ 8.
76. General Comment No. 37, supra note 60, ¶ 40.
77. Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 16 art. 17 ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (Apr. 8, 1988) [hereinafter General Comment No. 16].
78. Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Van Hulst v. the Netherlands, Communication 
No. 903/2000 ¶ 7.10 [hereinafter Van Hulst v. the Netherlands] (views adopted on Nov.1, 
2004, during the eighty-second session).
79. See Martin Scheinin (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
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(e) For a restriction to be permissible, it is not enough that it serves 
one of the enumerated legitimate aims; it must be necessary for 
reaching the legitimate aim; and
(f) Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of propor-
tionality; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective func-
tion; they must be the least intrusive instrument amongst those 
which might achieve the desired result; and they must be propor-
tionate to the interest to be protected.
80
Given specific reference in other limitation clauses of the ICCPR to 
public health,
81
we assume protection of public health can be “one of the 
enumerated legitimate aims” that could also limit privacy rights. In this 
way, the tests of necessity and proportionality are also among the standards 
secondary sources have used to determine whether “arbitrary and unlawful”
interference with privacy has occurred under ICCPR Article 17.
82
In a democratic society: The phrase “in a democratic society” appears 






The Siracusa Principles recognize this phrase “as imposing a fur-
ther restriction on the limitation clauses it qualifies” and is meant to ensure 
that the limitations “do not impair the democratic functioning of the socie-
ty.”
86
The Travaux Préparatoires reveal that the addition of the phrase “in a 
democratic society” was also debated with regard to Article 19, but ulti-
mately not included.
87
The amendments to include the phrase in the limita-
tion clauses were put forth by France.
88
Other member states were con-
cerned that the phrase was “not susceptible [to] precise interpretation and, 
since [the phrase was] frequently used as terms of abuse, [was] not suitable 
for inclusion in the covenant,”
89




Terrorism ¶ 17 A/HRC/13/37 (Dec. 28, 2009), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies
/hrcouncil/docs/13session/A-HRC-13-37.pdf.
80. See General Comment No. 27, supra note 48, ¶¶ 14–15.
81. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, arts. 12, 18, 19, 21–22.
82. See General Comment No. 16, supra note 77,  paras. 4, 7, 8; Van Hulst v. The 
Netherlands, supra note 78, ¶ 7.10.
83. See General Comment No. 27, supra note 48, ¶ 11 (applying the “in a democratic 
society” standard to art. 12(3)).
84. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 21.
85. Id. art 22.
86. Siracusa Principles, supra note 21 § I.A.ii.
87. Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 63, at 239–41.
88. Id. at 207–08, 239–41.
89. Id. at 243.
90. Id. at 207.
91. Id. at 249.
118 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:105
Non-discrimination: The Siracusa Principles also make clear that all the 
limitations are subject to the non-discrimination principle found in Article 
2(1) of the Covenant.
92
It is interesting to note that the grounds on which 
discrimination is prohibited in Article 2 are drafted differently than the 
grounds in Article 4.
93
When compared to Article 4, Article 2 includes the 
additional grounds of “political or other opinion,” “national origin,” “prop-
erty,” “birth,” and “other status.”
94
While “other status” may appear broad, 
the Human Rights Committee has been reluctant to define it, instead decid-
ing its meaning on a case by case basis.
95
A limitation may differentiate 
based on a protected status “if the criteria for such differentiation are rea-
sonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legiti-
mate under the Covenant.”
96
While only treaty language is binding on member states, these soft law 
mechanisms are considered influential in the interpretation and establish-
ment of customary international law.
97
As such, a legally rigorous analysis 
of COVID-19-related measures under the limitation clauses in Articles 
12(3), 17, 18, 19, 21, and 22 should focus on the principles of legality, ne-
cessity, proportionality, and, where relevant, non-discrimination. Articles 
12(3), 21, and 22 have the additional requirement of meeting the “in a dem-
ocratic society” standard. We analyze states’ COVID-19-related restrictions 
on freedom of movement, privacy, and freedom of association later in this 
article by primarily focusing on these tests.
3. Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations
In addition, some member states qualified their consent to ICCPR pro-
visions at the time of ratification using a reservation, an understanding, or a 
declaration (“RUD”), which may impact the lawfulness of their COVID-19-
related restrictions.
98
By way of example, the United States and Australia, 
included a general RUD to the Covenant, limiting the treaty to the scope of 
their constitutional powers.
99
The United States specifically notes that Arti-
92. Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, § I.A.9.
93. Compare ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2(1) with ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
94. Id.
95. MARINA SHARPE, THE REGIONAL LAW OF REFUGEE PROTECTION IN AFRICA 108 
(2018).
96. Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 18 ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Nov. 10, 1989) [hereinafter General Comment No. 18].
97. See Lane, supra note 22; see also Slagle et al., supra note 22.
98. Chung, supra note 26, at 173; Goldsmith supra note 26, at 312.
99. Australia attached the declaration: “Australia has a federal constitutional system in 
which legislative, executive and judicial powers are shared or distributed between the Com-
monwealth and the constituent States. The implementation of the treaty throughout Australia 
will be effected by the Commonwealth, State and Territory authorities having regard to their 
respective constitutional powers and arrangements concerning their exercise.” International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Declarations and Reservations (2020), U.N. TREATY 
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cles 1-27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.
100
As a result, the ICCPR 
cannot be directly enforced domestically in the United States.
101
Other counties directed their RUDs at more specific provisions. As re-
lated to the ICCPR articles discussed here, France included a reservation 
specific to Article 4 stating that the emergency powers in the French Consti-
tution are to be understood as meeting the purpose of Article 4.
102
France al-
so specified that the phrase “‘to the extent strictly required by the exigencies 
of the situation’ cannot place a limit on the power of the President to take 
‘the measures required by the circumstances.’”
103
Likewise, Trinidad and 
Tobago also reserved the right not to apply Article 4(2) in full.
104
The United 
States includes an understanding related to the discrimination clause in Arti-
cle 4(1) and states that it does not bar distinctions that may “have a dispro-
portionate effect upon persons of a particular status” in line with the United 
States’ Constitution.
105
Moreover, many states have issued RUDs relevant to 
the specific articles that may be most impacted by COVID-19-related 
measures, including Article 12, Article 17, and Article 21.
106
C. World Health Organization’s (“WHO”) International 
Health Regulations
When limitations are invoked to protect public health, the Siracusa 
principles affirm that “due regard should be given to the international health 
regulations of the World Health Organization.”
107
The International Health 
Regulations (“IHRs”) are a form of administrative law updated in 2005. 
IHRs give the WHO Director-General power to declare a public health 
emergency of international concern and to issue temporary recommenda-
tions relevant to address the emergency, in consultation with the WHO’s
Emergency Committee.
108
On January 30, 2020, the WHO’s Emergency 
Committee declared a public health emergency of international concern, 
COLLECTION,  https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 14, 2020) [hereinafter Declarations and Reserva-
tions]; see Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 313 (stating that the United States attached an under-
standing that the provisions it consented to were no more stringent than the analogous rule 
under the Constitution).
100. Declarations and Reservations, supra note 99.
101. Goldsmith, supra note 26, at 318.





107. Siracusa Principles, supra note 21 at § I.B.iv.26.
108. Constitution of the World Health Org. art. 2(k), July 22, 1946, 62 Stat. 2679, 14 
U.N.T.S. 185; see, e.g., World Health Org. [“WHO’], Revision of the International Health 
Regulations, WHA58.3 (May 23, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_
files/WHA58/ WHA58_3-en.pdf [hereinafter Revised IHR].
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signaling to member states the need to take action against COVID-19.
109
In 
April, the WHO’s Independent Oversight Advisory Committee proposed 
updating the IHRs to take account of lessons learned from addressing 
COVID-19.
110
The WHO also has responsibilities for monitoring and col-
lecting information from states about pandemics, but has been criticized for 
failing to use those powers adequately or early enough.
111
While the IHRs consist of regulations, some commentators have sug-
gested that they operate like a treaty to the extent they are binding on gov-
ernments in certain circumstances.
112
Article 3(1) of the regulations provides 
that they should be implemented, “with full respect for the dignity, human 
rights, and fundamental freedoms of persons.”
113
The IHRs were designed so 
that the declaration of a public health emergency of international concern is 
consistent with the kind of emergency contemplated under Article 4 of the 
ICCPR.
114
At least one commentator has suggested that the types of tempo-
rary recommendations envisaged under the IHRs would necessitate gov-
ernments to act under limitations included in the ICCPR.
115
This would not 
require governments to use a derogation analysis because the measures en-
visaged under Article 18 of the regulations primarily focus on measures 
which would infringe upon the right to privacy, the right to liberty (related 
to forced health quarantine detention) and the freedom of movement.
116
D. History of Derogation in Times of Crisis
Since the ICCPR’s entry into force in 1976, an array of member states 
have provided notice of derogation. These include states that have experi-
enced periods of civil unrest or threats of terrorism, as well as UN Security 
Council members.
117
Some states have notified a derogation only once, 
whereas others have issued multiple notices a year.
118
Several competing po-
109. Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir. Gen., World Health Org., Opening Re-
marks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19 (Mar. 11, 2020).
110. Independent Oversight and Advisory Committee for the WHO Health Emergencies 
Programme, Interim report on WHO’s response to COVID-19 7 (May 14, 2020).
111. Id.; see also Jennifer Shkabatur, A Global Panopticon - The Changing Role of In-
ternational Organizations in the Information Age, 33 MICH. J. INT’L L. 159, 171 (2011).
112. LAWRENCE GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH LAW 35 (2014).
113. Revised IHR, supra note 108, art. 3(1).
114. Andraž Zidar, WHO International Health Regulations and Human Rights: From 
Allusions to Inclusion 19 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. L. 505, 508 (Jun. 23, 2015).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al. supra note 23, at 678; see Derogation Notification 
supra note 6.
118. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 23, at 678; see Derogation Notification 
supra note 6.
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litical theories in international relations discuss why states derogate,
119
but 
this article focuses on the legal consequences of the decision whether to 
derogate in response to COVID-19.
Although the drafting history reveals that war was seen as the para-
mount example of a public emergency requiring derogation under Article 
4,
120




insurrection situations (Algeria, Ecuador), vandalism and the use of 
firearms (Argentina), serious political and social disturbances (Bo-
livia, Yugoslavia), terrorist activities (Azerbaijan, Chile, Colombia, 
Israel, Nepal, Peru, United Kingdom), subversive activities (Ecua-
dor, Bolivia), serious internal unrest caused by an economic crisis 
(Ecuador, Bolivia), natural disasters (Guatemala, Ecuador), clashes 
between demonstrators and defense forces (Panama), acts of sabo-
tage (Peru, Sri Lanka), violence caused by drug traffickers (Colom-
bia, Peru), need to avert a civil war, economic anarchy and destabi-
lization of state and social structures (Poland), violent nationalistic 
clashes (Russian Federation), civil war, a very chaotic socio-
economic and political situation, lawlessness and armed robbery 
(Sudan), the threat from international terrorism (United Kingdom), 
or the attempt to assassinate the President of the Republic (Vene-
zuela).
122
In several instances, the Human Rights Committee has been critical of 
member states’ use of derogation. Broadly, these criticisms can be classified 
as a derogation from non-derogable rights,
123
derogation in situations not 
covered by Article 4,
124
and failure to provide notice of derogation.
125
119. For a discussion of the theory of why states derogate, see generally Emilie M. 
Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 23.
120. Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Derogations from Human Rights Treaties in 
Armed Conflict in THE FRONTIERS OF HUMAN  RIGHTS 57, 63 (Nehal Bhuta ed., 2016).
121. Angelika Siehr, Derogation Measures under Article 4 ICCPR, with Special Con-
sideration of the ‘War against International Terrorism’, 47 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 545, 550 
(2004).
122. Id.; see Derogation Notification supra note 6.
123. General Comment No. 29, supra note 31, at ¶ 7 fn. 4 (citing the following com-
ments/concluding observations: Dominican Republic (1993), CCPR/C/79/Add.18, ¶ 4; Jordan 
(1994) CCPR/C/79/Add.35, ¶ 6; Nepal (1994) CCPR/C/79/Add.42, ¶ 9; Russian Federation 
(1995), CCPR/C/79/Add.54, ¶ 27; Zambia (1996), CCPR/C/79/Add.62, ¶ 11; Gabon (1996), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.71, ¶ 10; Colombia (1997) CCPR/C/79/Add.76, ¶ 25; Israel (1998), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.93, ¶ 11; Iraq (1997), CCPR/C/79/Add.84, ¶ 9; Uruguay (1998) 
CCPR/C/79/Add.90, ¶ 8; Armenia (1998), CCPR/C/79/Add.100, ¶ 7; Mongolia (2000), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.120, ¶ 14; Kyrgyzstan (2000), CCPR/CO/69/KGZ, ¶12.)
124. Id. ¶ 3 fn. 1 (citing the following comments/concluding observations: United Re-
public of Tanzania (1992), CCPR/C/79/Add.12, ¶ 7; Dominican Republic (1993), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.18, ¶ 4; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (1995), 
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Before COVID-19, only two states used Article 4 notification to ad-
dress a public health crisis, despite numerous states enacting emergency 
health measures.
126
Guatemala notified a derogation in May 2009 after de-
claring a public health emergency due to the H1N1 epidemic.
127
In 2006, 
Georgia notified the Secretary-General following a presidential decree to 
prevent the spread of bird flu.
128
At the time of writing, only Argentina, Ar-
menia, Chile, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan Latvia, Namibia, Para-
guay, Peru, the Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Senegal, the 
State of Palestine, and Thailand have notified the UN of derogation due to 
the COVID-19 pandemic.
129
III. ARE STATES PROPERLY CONSIDERING WHETHER COVID-19-
RELATED EMERGENCY HEALTH MEASURES REQUIRE A DEROGATION 
OR BALANCING OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS?
Since very few states have issued a derogation notice related to their 
COVID-19 emergency responses, it appears states are either (a) ignoring 
international human rights principles; (b) failing to follow the procedural 
requirements of Article 4; or (c) acting under the substantive limitation 
clauses. In this section, we will consider the harms caused specifically by 
each of these explanations as well as the overall harm created by uncertainty 
over if and how states are justifying their restrictions under the ICCPR.
A. Are States Analyzing Human Rights Damage Caused by 
COVID-19 Restrictions?
Given the extraordinary death toll and economic impact of the COVID-
19 emergency, it is not surprising that states quickly adopted emergency 
measures, nor is it surprising that states heavily value protection of public 
health as balanced against other human rights considerations. The small 
number of states issuing a notice of  derogation compared with the rapid and 
CCPR/C/79/Add.55, ¶ 23; Peru (1996), CCPR/C/79/Add.67, ¶ 11; Bolivia (1997), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.74, ¶ 14; Colombia (1997), CCPR/C/79/Add.76, ¶ 25; Lebanon (1997), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.78, ¶ 10; Uruguay (1998), CCPR/C/79/Add.90, ¶ 8; Israel (1998), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.93, ¶ 11).
125. Id. ¶ 17 fn. 10 (citing comments/concluding observations on Peru (1992) 
CCPR/C/79/Add.8, ¶ 10; Ireland (1993) CCPR/C/79/Add.21, ¶ 11; Egypt (1993), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.23, ¶ 7; Cameroon (1994) CCPR/C/79/Add.33, ¶ 7; Russian Federation 
(1995), CCPR/C/79/Add.54, ¶ 27; Zambia (1996), CCPR/C/79/Add.62, ¶11; Lebanon (1997), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.78, ¶ 10; India (1997), CCPR/C/79/Add.81, ¶ 19; Mexico (1999), 
CCPR/C/79/Add.109, ¶12).
126. See Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
127. Id. at Guatemala (May 6, 2020).
128. Id. at Georgia (Mar. 7, 2006).
129. See id. (listing as defined by the UN Treaty Collection Depository).
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almost universal imposition of restrictions on human rights for COVID-19
related reasons raises significant questions about whether ICCPR require-
ments have been upheld under either a limitations analysis or a derogation 
analysis.
130
The ICCPR requires that any emergency measure which re-
stricts rights should be legal, necessary, proportionate, and nondiscriminato-
ry.
131
Failure to conduct a clear analysis or file a notice of derogation also 
makes it challenging for individuals and international bodies, such as the 
Human Rights Committee, to look back after an emergency has ended to 
consider whether measures put in place because of the emergency have been 
rescinded or modified to restore liberties that may have been infringed.
1. Damage Caused by Ignoring International Human Rights Principles
If member states are failing to conduct any analysis of their obligations 
under the ICCPR in implementing their emergency measures in response to 
COVID-19, both individuals and the international legal system will suffer. 
For individuals, they may not receive the human rights protections that are 
the object and purpose of the ICCPR.
132
Domestic law may protect some 
rights in the face of emergency measures, but the ICCPR sets universal 
standards for all.
133
Failing to conduct a legal analysis under the ICCPR has 
the potential to produce several harms. First, states might improperly dero-
gate from rights that are deemed non-derogable under the treaty. Second, 
states may not provide the notice required by Article 4, reducing oversight 
by the international community.
134
Third, measures may not be time-limited 
and may continue even after their value in combating the pandemic has 
passed. Fourth, states may not analyze whether emergency measures are le-
gal, necessary, proportionate, and adhere to the principles of non-
discrimination.
130. By the sheer volume of COVID-inspired restrictions as opposed to the limited 
number of derogations, it appears that states are not conducting a rigorous limitations analysis 
or concluding that public health trumps other human rights without much rigor in their balanc-
ing analysis. Compare Derogation Notification, supra note 6 (showing only 22 states have 
issued formal notices of derogation ), with COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (showing that 
most states have enacted emergency measures in response to COVID-19). Unless a state men-
tions its balancing of human rights – as in the best practices we cite in the end of this article –
it is impossible to know whether it has rigorously balanced public health and other rights or 
just ignored the terms of the ICCPR in passing COVID-related restrictions.
131. Emergency Measures, supra note 3; Matt Pollard, COVID-19 Symposium: The 
Courts and Coronavirus (Part 1), OPINIO JURIS, (Apr. 3 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020
/04/03/covid-19-symposium-the-courts-and-coronavirus-part-i/.
132. See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], General Comment 24 para. 7, U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, (Nov. 2, 1994); Nahuel Maisley, The International Right of Rights? 
Article 25(a) of the ICCPR as a Human Right to Take Part in International Law-Making, 28 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 89, (2017) (stating the ICCPR does not create these rights but rather defines 
and establishes standards to measure them).
133. See Maisley, supra note 132.
134. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3).
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UN human rights officials have raised concerns about human rights 
abuses and violations during the COVID-19 emergency.
135
In order to ad-
vance the promotion and protection of international human rights, the UN 
Human Rights Council appoints Special Procedures Mandate Holders to ar-
ticulate and focus on certain areas of human rights.
136
A group of 17 such 
mandate holders issued a joint statement on March 16, 2020, warning gov-
ernments not to abuse the COVID-19 emergency to limit human rights.
137
Their statement urged states to avoid security measures that respond to 
COVID-19 with excessive or overreaching emergency powers reminding 
states that “any emergency responses to the coronavirus must be proportion-
ate, necessary and non-discriminatory” and that the “use of emergency 
powers must be publicly declared and should be notified to the relevant trea-
ty bodies.”
138
The statement also highlighted that the protection of public 
health should “not function as a cover for repressive action nor should it be 
used to silence the work of human rights defenders.”
139
Similarly, the chairs of the ten international human rights treaty bodies 
called on states to adhere to international human rights law in their handling 
of the COVID-19 crisis, such that no one is deprived of life-saving treat-
ment as a result of stigma, discrimination or other violation of IHRL.
140
Among the reasons to monitor human rights changes and violations in 
times of emergency is the potential harm to dissenters, minorities and vul-
nerable populations that could plausibly be reduced through increased over-
sight. Governments have used public emergencies as an excuse to justify 
discrimination, repression of political opponents, or to enhance marginaliza-
tion of minorities or other vulnerable populations.
141
These actions under-
score the importance of Article 4 limits on derogation and the requirement 
that derogations which violate non-discrimination principles are unlawful.
135. See COVID-19: States Should Not Abuse Emergency Measures to Suppress Human 
Rights, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”], (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25722&LangID=
E [hereinafter Statement from UN Experts, COVID-19].
136. See Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”], https://www.ohchr.org/en/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcome
page.aspx. (last visited May 18, 2020).
137. Statement from UN Experts, COVID-19, supra note 135.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies call for human rights approach in fighting 
COVID-19, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (Mar. 24, 2020), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25742&LangID=
E.
141. See Doug Rutzen & Nikhil Dutta, Pandemic and Human Rights, JUST SEC. (Mar. 
12, 2020) https://www.justsecurity.org/69141/pandemics-and-human-rights/; see also Coro-
navirus and Civic Space, INT’L CTR. FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT L. (Mar. 10, 2020) 
https://www.icnl.org/post/analysis/coronavirus-and-civic-space.
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In addition to the direct damage suffered by individuals, treaty non-
compliance undermines the systems created by the ICCPR and the Human 
Rights Committee. Non-compliance can lessen the utility of the treaty as a 
mechanism that civil society actors can use to pressure governments to re-
spect human rights. More broadly, noncompliance with one core human 
rights treaty may weaken general habits of compliance and erode the overall 
international human rights regime.
142
Thus, if member states fail to recog-
nize the ICCPR in implementing their emergency measures, not only is the 
legitimacy of the ICCPR harmed, but it creates a slippery slope threatening 
adherence to the international rule of law in general.
143
B. Damage Caused by Failing to Follow the Procedural Requirements 
of Article 4
Alternatively, member states might conduct a legal analysis under Arti-
cle 4 of the ICCPR to implement emergency measures, but fail to follow the 
notification procedures. While this may cause less damage than ignoring the 
ICCPR, as states may consider the substantive principles of necessity, pro-
portionality, non-discrimination, and compatibility with other obligations 
under international law, divorcing substantive requirements of derogation 
from the procedural requirements still creates problems.
When a state fails to provide notice of a derogation to the UN Secre-
tary-General, other member states also do not get notice. The failure to pro-
vide notice of a derogation limits opportunities for oversight, analysis, and 
disagreement with a state’s derogation practice. It disrupts the balance envi-
sioned by the ICCPR, that emergency divergence from human rights re-
quires oversight. The notification mechanism is meant to provide other 
member states an opportunity to challenge a derogation,
144
and it provides 
the Human Rights Committee the chance to examine and to comment on the 
emergency measures during the member state’s review or when issuing 
General Comments interpreting the ICCPR.
145
For states that are party to the 
First Optional Protocol, establishing the individual complaint mechanism, 
the notification procedure also informs potential victims who can then bring 
a complaint before the Committee.
146
Without the transparency provided by 
the notification mechanism that allows the Human Rights Committee to 
comment on the state’s emergency measures, jurisprudence related to 
ICCPR derogations is stunted.
147
142. See Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 189, 203–04 (2006).
143. Id.
144. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., supra note 23, at 677.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. The Human Rights Committee has commented on instances when states are acting 
under Article 4 without providing notice of derogation, but this requires the Committee to in-
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In addition to providing the transparency necessary for dissent, the noti-
fication mechanism serves to reinforce the substantive requirements of Arti-
cle 4. Article 4(3) requires that member states include in a notice of deroga-
tion the specific rights and freedoms derogated, the reason for derogation, 
and notification of when the measures will be terminated.
148
Providing the 
specific rights and freedoms derogated as well as the reason for derogation 
helps to ensure that member states are acting in a necessary and proportion-
ate manner to the emergency. Moreover, requiring states to notify the Secre-
tary-General when the derogation will be terminated reinforces the time-
limited nature of derogations. During the first six months of the pandemic, 
many of the states that initially issued notices of derogation have since noti-
fied the Secretary General of either extensions and/or terminations to their 
states of emergency.
149
This continued engagement of states with Article 4’s
notification mechanism strengthens the safeguards of oversight and demon-
strates some states are reassessing the proportionality of the emergency 
measures. Without providing notice of derogation or termination, these 
safeguards are diminished.
IV. DAMAGE CAUSED BY ACTING UNDER THE SUBSTANTIVE
LIMITATION CLAUSES
Member states may also be acting under the substantive limitation 
clauses found in the individual articles of the ICCPR when they establish 
their emergency measures to respond to COVID-19. As previously dis-
cussed, member states utilizing this escape mechanism must still adhere to 
the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality, and non-discrimination 
to be in compliance with the treaty.
150
However, when using a limitation 
clause to enact an emergency measure, there is not an explicit temporal 
limitation as there is with derogation, nor the need to declare a state of 
emergency officially.
151
As a result, states may keep emergency measures 
limiting the rights of the ICCPR in place even after the crisis has passed. 
Although the necessity or proportionality principles may capture the notion 
that emergency measures cannot linger past the emergency, because no offi-
cial state of emergency is required, in practice, a limitations analysis pro-
vides no demarcation as to when limitations must be repealed. Without a 
fer intent to act under Article 4 and may not capture all instances where countries are using 
Article 4 without providing notice. See supra fn. 124 for examples.
148. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3).
149. See Derogation Notification, supra note 6 (noting notices of extension from Arme-
nia, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, 
San Marino  and Thailand; noting notices of termination from Columbia, Estonia, Latvia, the 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, and San Marino).
150. See infra Part II.B.2.
151. McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 383.
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transparent deadline for restoring rights and liberties at the end of an emer-
gency, restrictions might easily remain in place.
152
Additionally, unlike a derogation, states face no notification require-
ment when they act under a limitation clause in a time of emergency.
153
Be-
yond losing the oversight that comes with a notification, states are not re-
quired to justify their limitations in writing, as they would be with a 
derogation. Without a clearly articulated statement of necessity to argue 
against, advocates have a harder time pointing to the moment when the ne-
cessity for the state’s imposition of a restriction expires. Notification may 
also serve to constrain the state’s emergency powers and reflect a positive 
commitment to the principles of legality and normalcy; features lost when 
acting under a limitation.
154
Guidance by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’
(“OHCHR”) issued in April 2020 relating to emergency measures and 
COVID-19 states that “[e]mergency measures, including derogation or sus-
pension of certain rights, should be subject to periodic and independent re-
view by the legislature.”
155
While the rules governing derogation requires 
such review, nothing in the ICCPR requires a later review by a legislature, 
or any other branch of government, for restrictions enacted under a limita-
tion clause. General Comment 29 further underscores this point stating, 
“[t]he restoration of a state of normalcy where full respect for the Covenant 
can again be secured must be the predominant objective of a State party 
derogating from the Covenant.”
156
Because states may enact measures under 
the limitation clauses regardless of whether there is a state of emergency,
157
jurisprudence does not exist regarding restoration of normalcy under a limi-
tation clause, unless it is captured by the principles of necessity and propor-
tionality.
158
While OHCHR may call for review and oversight for emergency 
restrictions, if states enact the measures pursuant to limitation rather than as 
a derogation, they face no binding treaty requirement or institutional mech-
anism to require a review when the emergency ends.
159
152. The joint statement of Mandate Holders on March 16, 2020 contemplates this issue 
stating, “authorities must seek to return life to normal and must avoid excessive use of emer-
gency powers to indefinitely regulate day-to-day life.”. Statement from UN Experts, COVID-
19, supra note 135.
153. Compare ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(3) with ICCPR, supra note 4, art.12(3).
154. See Scheinin, supra note 79.
155. Emergency Measures, supra note 3.
156. General Comment No. 29, supra note 31, ¶ 5.
157. Ponta, supra note 35 (stating “[e]ven in “ordinary times,” limitations on non-
absolute rights or freedoms are permissible”).
158. See infra II.B.2.
159. Id.
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B. About Which Escape Mechanism Member States are Using to Justify 
COVID-19-Inspired Restrictions Undermines the ICCPR
Uncertainty about whether member states are undertaking a legal analy-
sis when implementing restrictions on human rights to combat COVID-19
or not produces its own set of harms and undermines the Covenant, espe-
cially in the face of a global crisis.
For rights that are subject to both a limitation clause and derogation un-
der Article 4, there is little guidance on when the scope of a limitation ex-
ceeds the clause, requiring the member state to justify its action through a 
derogation. A member state may not invoke a derogation for what it could
achieve through a limitation, and the treaty encourages the use of limitations 
rather than derogations.
160
While the Human Rights Committee and the Si-
racusa Principles focus on when a limitation or derogation is permissible, 
there is no clear standard for when a derogation becomes necessary. The Si-
racusa Principles state that the scope of a limitation shall not be interpreted 
so as to “jeopardize the essence of the right concerned.”
161
But it is clear 
from member states’ disparate use of the derogation clause regarding 
COVID-19 measures that confusion is widespread about the permissible 
scope of the limitations and at what point a derogation rather than a limita-
tion is required under the ICCPR. The division between limitations and der-
ogations is further confused because principles such as proportionality and 
non-discrimination are applicable to both.
162
The lack of a clear standard 
may lead to member states issuing a notice of derogation in a situation 
where it might not be required, in essence using the derogation as a safety 
net.
163
At the same time, other member states may conceivably stretch the 
limitation clause to avoid international oversight. In the case of COVID-19, 
this could account for the disparate results where when undertaking the 
same action some states use limitation clauses while others issue notices of 
derogation.
The confusion between limitation clauses and derogations undermines 
the Covenant in several ways. First, it disrupts the progressive structure of 
the Covenant which envisions greater oversight and more restricted use of 
160. See General Comment No. 29, supra note 31,  ¶ 4 (stating “[d]erogation from obli-
gations in emergency situations is clearly distinct from restrictions or limitations allowed even 
in normal times under several provisions of the Covenant.”); see also Siracusa Principles, su-
pra note 21, para. 53 (stating “[a] measure is not strictly required by the exigencies of the sit-
uation where ordinary measures permissible under the specific limitations clauses of the Cov-
enant would be adequate to deal with the threat to the life of the nation.”); McGoldrick, supra 
note 25, at 384.
161. Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, ¶ 2.
162. McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 383–84.
163. Emanuele Sommario, Limitation and Derogation Provisions in International Hu-
man Rights Law Treaties and Their Use in Disaster Settings, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISASTERS, 98, 113 (Flavia Zorzi Giustiniani, Emanuele Sommario, 
Federico Casolari, & Giulio Bartolini eds., 2018).
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derogations as opposed to limitations which are less procedurally con-
strained but more limited in application. Second, it creates uncertainty for 
observers as to whether member states are acting under a limitation clause 
or if they are disregarding the notification provision of Article 4. Third, 
member states are defining the scope of the limitation clauses on a regional 
basis rather than universally. The global nature of the COVID-19 pandemic 
highlights these issues as multiple member states are simultaneously grap-
pling with their response to the same threat. As the global community pro-
ceeds to address other large-scale crises such as the War on Terror or cli-
mate disasters, the need to strengthen multilateral human rights instruments 
with clear standards and consistent application will become more acute and 
this analysis will prove useful.
The ICCPR’s escape mechanisms are implemented progressively. Ra-
ther than a general limitation clause as in the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights, the ICCPR’s drafters included the limitation provisions within 
the specific substantive right. This change “reflected a desire to tailor limita-
tions to assure maximum protection for the individual,”
164
meaning limita-
tions are only allowed on the grounds stated within the relevant Article. The 
inclusion of limitations in the ICCPR recognizes that most human rights are 
not absolute and require balancing individual and community interests.
165
As 
such, these rights can be limited permanently and still conform to the 
ICCPR.
166
In contrast, a derogation completely or partially eliminates an in-
ternational obligation.
167
Because derogations cast a wider scope in restrict-
ing rights than limitations do, the Covenant confines their use to narrow cir-
cumstances and subjects them to the notification provision, allowing others 
to monitor implementation. Unlike a limitation, when a derogation is used, 
it must be time-limited.
168
At the same time, the Covenant flatly prohibits 
the derogation of certain rights, deeming the obligation to protect those 
rights too important to be eliminated even in emergencies.
169
In this way, the 
ICCPR creates a progressive model in which increased restrictions on rights 
are subject to narrower circumstances and greater oversight.
Based on this model, when an emergency situation arises, the Covenant 
is designed so states first act within the scope of permissible limitations be-
fore seeking to eliminate an obligation through a derogation.
170
However, 
the Covenant does not provide clear standards for member states to ascer-
164. Alexandre Charles Kiss, Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS - THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 290, 
291(Louis Henkin ed. 1981).
165. McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 383.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, ¶¶ 45(c), 48; Emergency Measures, supra note 
3.
169. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 4(2).
170. See infra fn. 157.
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tain the permissible scope of limitations. This means states often deploy 
derogations in a precautionary fashion, contrary to the ICCPR’s ideal priori-
tization.
171
It also creates an incentive for states who want to avoid interna-
tional oversight to stretch what can be properly accomplished through a lim-
itation. The Covenant envisions increasing oversight as restrictions rise in 
scope or severity—putting in stricter requirements for derogation than limi-
tations. This balance is disrupted by states’ differing interpretations about 
the scope of permissible limitations.
For example, Latvia was one of the first countries to notify a COVID-
19-related derogation to the UN on March 16, 2020.
172
It justified using a
derogation because it would be impossible to assess limitations during the 
crisis individually.
173
Latvia is not the only state to approach derogation dur-
ing the COVID-19 crisis in a precautionary way. Estonia’s notice of deroga-
tion said, “some of these measures may involve a derogation. . .”
174
The use 
of “may” suggests Estonia may not have intended to suspend rights.
175
While this prophylactic use of derogation respects the Covenant, it raises 
questions about whether a derogation was truly necessary and appropriate.
The Human Rights Committee has also expressed concern with the 
“underuse” of derogations. For example, the Human Rights Committee has 
rebuked several states for failing to provide notice of a derogation.
176
Other 
states facing a public emergency have claimed to be acting under the limita-
tion clauses of the substantive rights.
177
In 1976, the UK submitted a notice 
of derogation to the Secretary-General concerning Northern Ireland but 
withdrew the notice in 1984.
178
In explaining the withdrawal, the UK stated 
that the emergency continued, but there had been a change in the measures 
for addressing it,
179
suggesting it was now justifying its restrictions under a 
limitations analysis. Because of ambiguity in ICCPR limitation clauses, 
states over- and under- use of derogation to fit their agendas.
Further, when states enact emergency measures without providing no-
tice of derogation, it is difficult to tell whether a state is acting under the 
171. Sommario, supra note 163.
172. Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
173. E-mail from Janis Karklins, Lat. Ambassador to the U.N. in Geneva to authors 
(April 2, 2020, 12:51 PM CET) (on file with authors).
174. Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
175. Sommario, supra note 163, at 113.
176. See infra n. 126.
177. McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 384 (citing UN Doc. A/34/40, ¶ 383 (1979) (Cy-
prus), UN Doc. A/35/40, ¶297 (1980) (Suriname), UN Doc. A/54/40, Vol. I. ¶ 324 (Mexico), 
and UN Doc. A/46/40, ¶¶ 618–56 (Iraq)).
178. See McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 385 (citing UN Doc. CCPR/C/2/Add.8, App.II, 
2) (stating the United Kingdom has “come to the conclusion that it is no longer necessary, in 
order to comply with its obligations under the Covenant, for the United Kingdom to continue, 
at present time, to avail itself of the right of derogation under Article 4.”)
179. McGoldrick, supra note 25, at 385 (citing UN Doc. CCPR/C/SR.594, ¶ 3).
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limitation clause, acting under Article 4 without providing notice, or ignor-
ing its treaty obligations altogether. This uncertainty, whether real or per-
ceived, undermines the treaty as a whole by creating distrust about the de-
gree of compliance. The lack of a derogation notice also complicates the 
Human Rights Committee’s task of evaluating emergency restrictions.
The lack of jurisprudence and clear standards about when an emergency 
situation warrants derogation is also creating unhelpful regional variation in 
practice which is incompatible with the treaty. With COVID-19, for exam-
ple, Latvia was a first mover in March 2020, quickly followed by Armenia, 
Romania, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, and Estonia.
180
  This practice 
within the UN’s Eastern Europe Group could appear to demonstrate a re-
gional understanding of the importance of derogation as opposed to the 
limitation in the COVID-19 situation. Likewise, during the six month period 
this article focuses on eight countries from the Latin American and Caribbe-
an Group have also issued notices of derogation although they did not move 
as early as those in the Eastern Europe Group.
181
In contrast, only one coun-
try from the Western European and Other Group (San Mario), two countries 
from the Asia Pacific Group (Kyrgyzstan and Thailand) and three countries 
from the Africa Group (Ethiopia, Namibia, and Senegal), have issued notic-
es of derogation.
182
Because the ICCPR does not utilize the margin of appre-
ciation doctrine,
183
such regional understandings of the derogation mecha-
nism are not only confusing but incompatible with the treaty.
As the ICCPR is increasingly utilized to protect human rights in the 
face of global threats such as terrorism and climate change, clear definitions 
about the scope of limitation provisions are needed. Such clarity will help 
states receive the proper oversight for their actions, limiting over- and un-
der- use of derogations. It will also allow member states and the Human 
Rights Committee to more readily and accurately assess compliance and to 
prevent the emergence of conflicting regional understandings of the ICCPR, 
strengthening the treaty regime overall.
IV. A RIGOROUS LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS FOR MEASURES INFRINGING 
FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
We now turn to a consideration of what a rigorous limitations analysis 
might look like for travel bans, stay-at-home orders, quarantines, digital 
surveillance, and bans on public gatherings, along with how international 
human rights might be harmed by such measures. Most states adopted some, 
180. Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Dominick McGoldrick, A Defense of the Margin of Appreciation and an Argument 
for Its Application by the Human Rights Committee, 65 INT’L & COMP. L. QUARTERLY 21, 21 
(2015).
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if not all, of these measures in response to COVID-19, but only twenty-two 
have notified that they implemented a derogation.
184
With respect to each of 
three types of rights—freedom of movement, freedom of assembly, and pri-
vacy rights—we consider whether the restrictions states have imposed meet 
the tests of legality, necessity, and proportionality, as well as non-
discrimination. In addition, we discuss whether other tests or additional fac-
tors might provide a better way of assessing compliance with the ICCPR in 
our modern digital age and in the context of COVID-19 limitations. These 
include assessing whether restrictions are necessary for a democratic socie-
ty, looking at the COVID-19-related context in which specific restrictions 
are imposed, encouraging consultation between health, information technol-
ogy, and legal experts in crafting limitations, and considering how modern 
technology and online alternatives impact the limitations analysis.
Many member states have curtailed the right to freedom of movement 
in response to COVID-19. According to the COVID-19 Tracker and as of 
September 2020, at least 107 countries have adopted measures limiting 
freedom of movement.
185
Both quarantines and travel restrictions have been 
widely implemented as public health measures designed to stop the spread 
of the virus.
186
While limitations on freedom of movement vary widely in 
scope, they can include restricting the right to leave a country, restricting 
inter-country travel, and restricting the right to enter one’s country.
187
At the 
beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, such restrictions often targeted peo-
ple in virus hot spots, but as the virus has spread, restrictions have become 
more wide-reaching.
188
In this section, we analyze (A) requirements for limi-
tations on freedom of movement under Article 12(3) looking at quarantines 
and travel restrictions; and (B) whether citizens legally can be stopped from 
returning to their own country under Article 12(4).
A. Freedom of Movement Restrictions Under Article 12(3)
Article 12(3) provides that states may limit the right to “liberty of 
movement and freedom to choose his residence” as well as the freedom to 
“leave any country” found in Article 12(1) and Article 12(2), respectively.
189
Below we consider the two most salient emergency measures implemented 
under 12(3): quarantines and travel restrictions.
In the public health sphere, a quarantine is defined as “the separation of 
persons (or communities who have been exposed to an infectious disease,”
while isolation applies to “the separation of persons who are known to be 
184. See Derogation Notification, supra note 6.
185. COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See Coronavirus Restrictions in Each State, supra note 2.
189. ICCPR, supra, note 4, art. 12.
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infected.”
190
However, laws often conflate the two terms, referring to both 
under the umbrella of quarantine.
191
This article uses quarantine to mean 
measures restricting individuals to their residence or other quarantine sites 
and includes “stay-at-home orders” and “lockdowns.” Likewise, this section 
considers travel restrictions limiting the ability to enter, leave, and travel 
within a country. As in the real world, the precise contours between broad 
quarantine and limits on inter-country travel are not well defined.
Because quarantines and travel restrictions can be employed to limit the 
movement of potentially large groups of asymptomatic people, they are one 
of the most aggressive and controversial public health tools for controlling 
the spread of infectious disease.
192
Historically, quarantines have been used 
since the 14th century, when ships were required to sit in port for forty days 
to protect coastal cities from the plague.
193
Most recently, quarantines have 
been deployed to combat both Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(“SARS”) and Ebola.
194
Similarly, states have used their borders as a control 
point for stopping the spread of diseases such as Yellow Fever.
195
In re-
sponse to COVID-19, quarantine and travel restriction measures imple-
mented by member states vary widely in scope and scale, ranging from bor-




For a limitation on freedom of movement to meet the legality standard, 
it must be contained in a “national law of general application, which is in 
force at the time when the limitation is applied.”
197
The COVID-19 Tracker 
shows that most measures related to freedom of movement restrictions have 
been implemented by an order, regulation, or law.
198
Applied to the COVID-
19 situation, for a quarantine or travel restriction stemming from an order or 
regulation to meet this legality standard, the power that places the limit on 
freedom of movement must be contained in national law. Because quaran-
190. Wendy E. Parmet & Michael S. Sinha, COVID-19 - The Law and Limits of Quaran-
tine, NEW ENG. J. MED., e28(1), e28(1) (Apr. 9, 2020).
191. Id.
192. Mark A. Rothstein, From SARS to Ebola: Legal and Ethical Considerations for 
Modern Quarantine, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 227, 227–28 (2015).
193. History of Quarantine, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, (Jan. 10, 
2012), https://www.cdc.gov/quarantine/historyquarantine.html.
194. Rothstein, supra note 192.
195. See New Yellow Fever Vaccination Requirements for Travelers, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., (Jul. 27, 2016), https://www.who.int/ith/updates/20160727/en/ (discussing how the cer-
tificate of vaccination against yellow fever is required for some travelers).
196. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement”).
197. Emergency Measures, supra note 3.
198. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement”).
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tines are well-established public health tools, most states have laws allowing 
the government to mandate quarantines or other legal mechanisms to im-
plement such measures.
199
For example, Australia used an order, pursuant to 
section 7 of the Public Health Act of 2010, in New South Wales to require 
individuals to stay in their residence absent a reasonable excuse.
200
Botswa-
na declared a nationwide lockdown and curfew from 8 PM to 8 AM, using 
regulations issued under the Emergency Power Act, which specifically al-
lows for limitations of freedom of movement.
201
The United Kingdom im-
plemented its freedom of movement restriction by law, passing the Corona-
virus Act 2020, giving UK authorities emergency powers to address the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
202
Article 12(3) also states that any limitation must be “consistent with the 
other rights recognized in the present Covenant.”
203
A limitation that is 
properly passed according to domestic law should not, according to this 
standard, conflict with the objects and purposes of the treaty.
204
In a situation 
where a person must leave a state in the context of asylum-seeking, an exit 
ban
205
could be incompatible with other ICCPR rights such as the right to 
life or freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
206
States imposing restrictions need to examine the limitation in the context of 
the ICCPR as a whole.
In addition, the OHCHR issued guidance on the legality standard, stat-
ing that “[t]he law must not be arbitrary or unreasonable, and it must be 
clear and accessible to the public.”
207
Even where restrictions have been is-
199. See Rothstein, supra note 192, at 228.
200. Public Health (COVID-19 Restrictions on Gathering and Movement) Order 2020 
Under the Public Health Act 2010, 2020 (N.S.W.) Part I (Austl.), Government Gazette No. 65 
of March 30, 2020 149–1163. (defining orders as executive measures including executive or-
ders and presidential decrees).
201. Emergency Powers (COVID-19) Regulations, 2020 Under the Emergency Powers 
Act, Supplement C 2020 Part II (Bots.), Botswana Extraordinary Government Gazette, April 
2, 2020; see also Emergency Powers, 1966, Chapter 22:04 (Bots.), http://extwprlegs1.fao.org
/docs/pdf/bot91330.pdf (defining regulation as measures that guide the implementation of law 
and including “(a) make provision for the detention of persons or the restriction of their 
movements.”).
202. Coronavirus Act 2020, c. 7 (UK). The tracker defines laws as measures that have 
been enacted through the legislative process.
203. ICCPR supra note 4, art. 12(3).
204. Siracusa Principles supra note 21,  ¶ 5.
205. See Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin, (Full Text) PM’s Movement Control Order Speech 
in English, NEW STRAIT TIMES (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.nst.com.my/news
/nation/2020/03/575372/full-text-pms-movement-control-order-speech-english (illustrating 
Malaysia as an example of a state imposing restrictions on exiting the country as part of its 
COVID-19 response measures).
206. Kate Ogg, COVID-19 Travel Bans: The Right to Seek Asylum When You Cannot 
Leave Your Homeland, UNSW L., (Apr. 16, 2020) https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au
/publication/covid-19-travel-bans-right-seek-asylum-when-you-cannot-leave-your-homeland.
207. Emergency Measures, supra note 3.
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sued in accordance with the legislative process, many states are struggling 
with communicating the laws to the public. The New York Times reported 
on confusion over quarantine guidelines in New York, noting “when the au-
thorities do issue guidance or directives, they can seem contradictory or il-
logical.”
208
The public faced similar confusion in the United Kingdom, with 
contradictory messaging from government officials about the contours of 
the lockdown order in London.
209
It appears that many, if not most governments have or have made some 
effort to demonstrate legal authority to implement quarantines, and those 
doing so in response to COVID-19 have followed their legal process, 
whether that involves action by the legislative or executive branch of gov-
ernment.
210
However, a rigorous legal analysis must ensure that the re-
striction comports with the rest of the ICCPR and that the public is informed 
of the contours of any limitations in order to meet the legality standard.
2. Necessity
Restrictions on freedom of movement must be “necessary to protect”
the legitimate aims contained in the treaty, according to ICCPR standards.
211
In the instance of COVID-19, quarantines and travel restrictions must be 
necessary to protect public health.
212
States have recognized the potential necessity of quarantines in their le-
gal regimes. In the United States, for example, federal quarantine and isola-
tion powers may be implemented in response to a closed list of diseases, 
which include “severe acute respiratory syndromes” encompassing COVID-
208. Andy Newman, Confusion Over Coronavirus Quarantines Feeds Anxiety, N.Y.
TIMES, (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/nyregion/coronavirus-ny-
quarantines.html.
209. See Jill Lawless, UK Clamps Down to Fight Virus, but Confusion Still Reigns,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, (Mar. 24, 2020), https://apnews.com/5131953f9d8fe0b47c08accf
9241f499 (noting contradictory government statements regarding children moving between 
households).
210. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement”) (showing that most 
measures related to freedom of movement restriction have been implemented by an order, 
regulation or a law, with the exception of the travel lockdowns in Wuhan and cities in Hubei 
province which were issued by central government policy). But see Decision on the Extension 
of the Temporary Measure, CONST. CT. REPUBLIC KOS., (Mar. 31, 2020), https://gjk-
ks.org/vendimet-nga-seancat-shqyrtuese-te-mbajtura-me-30-dhe-31-mars-2020/. Although the 
analysis was not conducted under the ICCPR, the Constitutional Court in Kosovo ruled that 
the Law on the Prevention of Spreading Infectious Disease does not specifically provide for 
the restriction of freedom of movement as required to limit the Constitutional right to freedom 
of movement. Jack Robinson & Eve-anne Travers, Government Decision Restricting Freedom 
of Movement Ruled Unconstitutional, PRISHTINA INSIGHTS, (Mar. 31, 2020) 
https://prishtinainsight.com/government-decision-restricting-movement-ruled-
unconstitutional/.
211. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 12(3).
212. Id.
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19.
213
The U.S. Supreme Court discussed this sentiment in Jacobson v. Mas-
sachusetts, stating that it is necessary that a “well-ordered society” can en-
force “reasonable regulations” to effectively respond to “an epidemic dis-
ease which threatens the safety of its members.”
214
Given the broad use of 
quarantines globally to combat COVID-19 and the potential of asymptomat-
ic transmission, states are likely to find quarantines necessary to protect 
public health. For example, the WHO recommends that “contacts of patients 
with laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 be quarantined for fourteen days 
from the last time they were exposed to the patient.”
215
The WHO has previ-
ously justified even involuntary quarantines based on its assessment of bal-
ancing between public health needs and freedom of movement concerns.
216
As such, most states will be able to satisfy the necessity principle in relation 
to quarantines, although it should be reassessed as transmission progresses 
and scientific understanding evolves.
However, the WHO has criticized the use of travel restrictions to com-
bat COVID-19. In its updated recommendations, the WHO “advises against 
the application of travel or trade restriction on countries with COVID-19
outbreaks.”
217
The recommendation continues, “[t]ravel bans to affected are-
as or denial of entry to passengers coming from affected areas are usually 
not effective in preventing the importation of cases but may have a signifi-
cant economic and social impact.”
218
Further, sixteen global health law 
scholars recently concluded in a Lancet commentary that imposing travel 
restrictions against China during the COVID-19 outbreak violates the 
213. 42 C.F.R. §§70.1–.9 (2015) (regulating interstate quarantine through E.O. 13295) 
as amended by Exec. Order No. 13674, 79 Fed. Reg. 45671 (July 31, 2014). Under these or-
ders, federal quarantine and isolation powers currently apply to the following diseases: chol-
era; diphtheria; infectious tuberculosis; plague; smallpox; yellow fever; viral hemorrhagic fe-
vers; influenza caused by new or reemergent flu viruses that are causing, or have the potential 
to cause, a pandemic; and severe acute respiratory syndromes (which may include COVID-
19).
214. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905); see also Polly J. Price, Quaran-
tine and Liability in the Context of Ebola, 131 PUB. HEALTH REP. 500, 502 (2016).
215. World Health Org. [“WHO”], Considerations for Quarantine of Individuals in the 
Context of Containment for Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), at 1–2, WHO/2019-
nCoV/IHR_Quarantine/2020.2 (Mar. 19, 2020).
216. WHO Guidance on Human Rights and Involuntary Detention for XDR-TB Control,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 24, 2007), https://www.who.int/tb/features_archive/involuntary_
treatment/en/ (“Therefore, interference with freedom of movement when instituting quarantine 
or isolation for a communicable disease such as MDR-TB and XDR-TB may be necessary for 
the public good, and could be considered legitimate under international human rights law. 
This must be viewed as a last resort and justified only after all voluntary measures to isolate 
such a patient have failed.”) (italics in original).
217. Updated WHO Recommendations for International Traffic in Relation to COVID-
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IHRs.
219
Given the support for the IHRs in the WHO and the Siracusa Prin-
ciples,
220
member states could find that travel bans fail to meet the principle 
of necessity.
This analysis highlights the need for states to consult public health ex-
perts when pursuing the “public health” goals in the limitation clauses. We 
suggest that rigorous legal analysis cannot be complete without collabora-
tion between technical experts and domestic policymakers.
3. Proportionality
As with necessity, an assessment of proportionality is best guided by 
public health and technical collaboration with policymakers. The Human 
Rights Committee expands on the notion of proportionality in relation to 
Article 12(3) stating:
Restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportional-
ity; they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; 
they must be the least restrictive instrument among those that might 
achieve the desired result; and they must be proportionate to the in-
terest to be protected.
221
In the event that states could show that international travel restrictions 
are necessary, it will be difficult to show that they are the least restrictive 
instrument. The WHO has offered guidance on less-restrictive alternatives, 
including risk communication, surveillance, patient management, and 
screening at ports of entry and exit.
222
In contrast, the WHO recommends using quarantines,
223
which states 
have implemented on various scales. China quarantined close to 60 million 
people in a two-day effort to limit transmission from the city of Wuhan in 
Hubei province.
224
Italy took a different approach by progressively expand-
ing quarantine from ten towns in Lombardy and one in Veneto to the entire 
country.
225
Meanwhile, in the United States, a letter from 800 public health 
and legal experts called for voluntary self-isolation measures in combination 
with education, widespread testing, and universal access to treatment, stat-
219. Roojin Habibi, Gian Luca Burci, Thana C. de Campos, Danwood Chirwa, Mar-
gherita Cina, Stephanie Dagron, Mark Eccleston-Turner, Lisa Forman, Lawrence O. Gostin, 
Benjamin Mason Meier, Stefania Negri, Gorik Ooms, Sharifah Sekalala, Allyn Taylor, Alicia 
Ely Yamin & Steven J. Hoffman, Commentary, Do Not Violate the International Health Reg-
ulations During the COVID-19 Outbreak, 395 LANCET, 664, 664 (2020).
220. Siracusa Principles, supra note 21, at § I.B.iv.
221. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 12(3).
222. Habibi et al., supra note 219.
223. See generally World Health Org. supra note 215.
224. Amy Qin, China May Be Beating the Coronavirus, at a Painful Cost, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/07/world/asia/china-coronavirus-cost.html.
225. Human Rights Dimensions of COVID-19 Response, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (Mar. 19, 
2020) https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/19/human-rights-dimensions-covid-19-response.
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ing they “are more likely to induce cooperation and protect public trust than 
coercive measures and are more likely to prevent attempts to avoid contact 
with the healthcare system.”
226
The WHO recommends that contacts of pa-
tients with laboratory-confirmed results be quarantined for 14 days.
227
This 
containment strategy assumes rapid identification through laboratory test-
ing, a capacity which not all states have met.
228
As such, an assessment of 
whether quarantine constitutes “least restrictive means” must be tailored to 
the region’s circumstances. For example, taking into account factors like 
geographic scope, healthcare infrastructure, testing capacity, the phase of 
the pandemic, and public compliance with other prevention measures are 
relevant to the assessment of what constitutes “least restrictive means.” In 
addition, the assessment should involve consultation with technical and 
health professionals based on up-to-date scientific information.
Beyond the scope of the quarantine and travel restrictions, we suggest 
that a proportionality assessment also should consider a limitation’s time 
frame. When states act under a limitation clause to restrict rights, the ICCPR 
has no explicit requirement that the restriction be time-limited and removed 
or reviewed after a certain time period, unlike for derogations.
229
This is a 
major shortcoming of using a limitation analysis during an emergency. The 
proportionality prong of a limitation analysis is the best place to capture this 
time factor. Because the COVID-19 emergency is not static, the assessment 
of proportionality and appropriateness of emergency measures will change 
as the situation progresses. For example, Croatia’s decision prohibiting in-
dividuals from leaving home without a special permit is only in effect for 
thirty days.
230
In contrast, Jordan’s movement restrictions are in place “until 
further notice.”
231
We do not categorically suggest states must include time 
limits in their emergency measures to be proportionate, but recommend time 
limits because they are an additional safeguard that states will review the 
proportionality of their COVID-19 response measures as the situation 
changes. If states proceed under a limitations analysis, including a time-
limit or a mechanism to trigger a later review of the emergency measures is 
226. Open Letter to Vice President Mike Pence, and Other Federal, State, and Local 
Leaders from Public Health and Legal Experts in the United States, Achieving a Fair and Ef-
fective COVID-19 Response, (Mar. 6, 2020) (on file with Yale Law School), 
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/ghjp/documents/march6_2020_final_covid-
19_letter_from_public_health_and_legal_experts_2.pdf.
227. World Health Org., supra note 215, at 2.
228. Id.
229. See McGoldrick supra, note 25, at 383 (stating limitations may be permanent).
230. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Croatia”) (stat-
ing “[t]he decision prohibits individuals from leaving their place of residence without a spe-
cial permit, to be issued for very limited cases. The decision is in effect for 30 days.”).
231. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Jordan”) (stat-
ing “[i]t is forbidden to move and roam people in All regions of the Kingdom, starting from 
seven in the morning on Saturday, 3/21/2020 until further notice.”).
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vital to guarantee that restrictions do not remain in place beyond the emer-
gency and that human rights are ultimately restored upon the emergency’s
end.
4. Non-discrimination
No limitation of the rights contained in the ICCPR may be imposed for 
a discriminatory purpose or applied in a discriminatory manner.
232
Article 
2(1) stipulates that any limitation must ensure that the rights of the Cove-
nant are applied “without distinction of any kind such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status.”
233
However, differential treatment is allowed un-
der the Covenant if the goal is to achieve a legitimate purpose, and the crite-
ria for such differentiation are reasonableness and objectiveness of the 
measure are met.
234
Several member states have limited freedom of movement based on 
age. Turkey restricts those over sixty-five from leaving their residence,
235
while Bosnia and Herzegovina’s order bans movement by citizens younger 
than eighteen and older than sixty-five.
236
Bulgaria takes a slightly different 
approach, restricting persons under sixty from visiting shops or pharmacies 
between 8:30 AM and 10:30 AM,
237
while Uzbekistan limits persons older 
than sixty-five from leaving their homes except to visit pharmacies or gro-
cery stores.
238
Despite creating restrictions that distinguish based on age, 
these types of limitations likely do not run afoul of the non-discrimination 
principle.
While age is not one of the listed protected statuses in Article 2(1), the 
Human Rights Committee has found that age is encompassed by the “any 
other status” provision.
239
However, states may be able to justify age differ-
entiation based on the legitimate aim of public health. Available data sug-
gests that older individuals are more likely to experience serious and life-
232. General Comment No. 22, supra note 64,  ¶ 8.
233. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2(1).
234. General Comment No. 18, supra note 96, para. 13.
235. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Turkey”)
236. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Bosnia Herze-
govina”). On April 3, the government revised the rule to allow older people to go out between 
7 AM and noon, Monday through Friday.
237. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Bulgaria”).
238. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Uzbekistan”).
239. See SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY (2nd 
ed, 2004), ¶¶ 23.25–23.29 (citing Schmitz-de-Jong v. Netherlands, Communication No 
855/1999 (July 16, 2001) and Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Love v. Australia, Com-
munication No. 983/2001 (Mar. 25, 2003).
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threatening responses to COVID-19.
240
Governments have an interest in 
avoiding infection of this highly susceptible population, to save lives, and to 
conserve treatment resources. In Love v. Australia, the Human Rights 
Committee found that imposing mandatory retirement for pilots at age sixty 
did not violate the non-discrimination principle because the widespread na-
tional and international practice at the time, of mandatory retirement at age 
sixty, suggested the differentiation was objective and reasonable.
241
Like-
wise, in the case of COVID-19, many states deploy age-related restrictions 
backed by data showing a correlation between the age of the person infected 
and the rate of morbidity and mortality.
242
However, states still need to ana-
lyze whether these limitations comply with other requirements of the 
ICCPR, especially whether they constitute the least restrictive means.
In other instances, member states have passed facially neutral re-
strictions but implemented them in a discriminatory manner. In Australia, 
reports claim that Indigenous and migrant communities have been dispro-
portionately targeted by police enforcing COVID-related movement re-
strictions.
243
In Bulgaria, checkpoint controls went into effect against two 
Sofia neighborhoods largely composed of the Roma community.
244
Both 
Australia and Bulgaria’s implementation of the limitations discriminates 
against groups protected by Article 2(1). So, while protecting public health 
meets the legitimate purpose test, states must also justify that their “criteria 
for such differentiation is reasonable and objective.”
245
Given the historical 
use of public health policy to discriminate against marginalized communi-
ties,
246
states should support any differential treatment with scientific evi-
dence and show that they meet the other requirements of the ICCPR.
240. See Groups at Higher Risk for Severe Illness, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (May 14, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-
precautions/groups-at-higher-risk.html (the CDC defines this group as people over 65).
241. See Human Rights Committee [“HRC”], Love v. Australia, Communication No. 
983/2001, ¶ 8.3 (Mar. 25, 2003).
242. See e.g., COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “movement” and “Uzbeki-
stan”). The Uzbekistani order restricts persons over sixty-five from leaving their homes noting 
that the elderly have made up the majority of COVID-19 deaths worldwide.
243. See Osman Faruqi, Compliance Fines Under the Microscope, SATURDAY PAPER,
(Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.thesaturdaypaper.com.au/news/health/2020/04/18/compliance-
fines-under-the-microscope/15871320009710.
244. Rights Group Criticises Quarantine of Roma Settlements in Bulgaria and Slovakia,
REUTERS, (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/health-coronavirus-bulgaria-
slovakia/rights-group-criticises-quarantine-of-roma-settlements-in-bulgaria-and-slovakia-
idUSL5N2C90TW.
245. General Comment No. 18, supra note 96, ¶ 13.
246. See e.g., Weijun Yu and Jessica Keralis, Controlling COVID-19: The Folly of In-
ternational Travel Restrictions, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 1 (Apr. 6, 2020), 
https://www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/controlling-covid-19-the-folly-of-international-travel-
restrictions/#_edn5 (citing Joseph J. Amon & Katherine Wiltenburg Todrys, Fear of Foreign-
ers: HIV-Related Restrictions on Entry, Stay, and Residence, 11 J. INT’L AIDS SOC. 8
(2008)).
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5.  In a Democratic Society
While the ICCPR text does not require that restrictions on freedom of 
movement qualify as necessary in a democratic society, General Comment 
27 explicitly extends this requirement to freedom of movement limita-
tions.
247
We explore this requirement in more detail in Section IV below, 
particularly as it relates to elections and other forms of democratic protest.
B. Freedom of Movement Restriction Under Article 12(4)
Article 12(4), regarding the right to enter one’s own country, is not sub-
ject to the same limitation clause found in Article 12(3). Instead, this article 
is written with the blanket prohibition stating, “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived.”
248
The Human Rights Committee has stated in General Comment 
27 that “there are few, if any, circumstances in which deprivation of the 
right to enter one’s own country could be reasonable.”
249
Nonetheless, the 
phrase “one’s own country” leaves room for interpretation. The burden is on 
the alleged victim to show that a State is their “own country” conferring 
rights under Article 12(4).
250
Additionally, citizenship alone may not be de-
terminative of one’s own country in the context of Article 12(4) without a 
real connection to the country.
251
As such, while the right appears absolute, it 
is subject to defining the right holder’s “own country.” Notwithstanding this 
question, any COVID-19 restriction, such as closing borders, that does not 
allow individuals to return to their “own country” would be overbroad and 
incompatible with the ICCPR.
V. A LIMITATIONS ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL COVID-19 SURVEILLANCE 
AND ITS IMPACT ON PRIVACY
Another critical tool states are deploying to address COVID-19 in-
volves digital surveillance. We consider in this section how digital tools for 
combatting COVID-19 fare under a rigorous limitations analysis of the lim-
ited right to avoid “arbitrary and unlawful interference” with privacy under 
Article 17 of the ICCPR. This section also catalogs many digital surveil-
lance tools and related applications being deployed against COVID-19 and 
analyzes their characteristics using a limitations analysis.
Considering whether the broad use of digital surveillance and enforce-
ment tools against COVID-19 is justified under the standards of legality, 
247. General Comment No. 27, supra note 48,  ¶ 11 (applying the “in a democratic soci-
ety” standard to art. 12(3)).
248. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 12(4).
249. General Comment No. 27, supra note 48,  ¶ 21.
250. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF EXPULSION AND EXCLUSION FROM THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 47–48  (Eric Fripp, Rowena Moffatt & Ellis Wilford eds., 2015).
251. Id. at 48.
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necessity, and proportionality and non-discrimination outlined above
252
is an 
important starting point for a rigorous limitations analysis. The legality test 
is largely met when digital tools are authorized by properly passed law and 
regulation, but with edicts requiring the use of digital surveillance apps em-
anating from a range of authorities—including workplaces, security and 
health ministries, and state governments—it is unclear whether all have 
been authorized or required by law. In considering necessity and propor-
tionality, we must first consider specifically whether digital surveillance 
tools produce an “arbitrary” invasion of privacy, as this is a threshold ques-
tion for determining whether any violation of Article 17 has occurred.
253
In 
many ways, arbitrariness is linked to necessity and proportionality. Thus we 
examine those factors in combination. Finally, we address whether failure to 
protect private data, after it has been digitally collected to combat COVID-
19, might produce an additional privacy violation. We review developing 
standards related to a right of data protection and note that privacy viola-
tions could result from problems with data storage, transfer, and lack of 
consent, if, for example, COVID-19 surveillance data was inappropriately 
shared with the public or law enforcement agencies. We conclude with rec-
ommendations to better protect privacy during the pandemic, including a 
call for better coordination of the legal, health, and technical communities in 
deploying privacy-protecting technologies in COVID-19 surveillance and 
response.
A. Violations of Privacy Rights Through Digital Surveillance and 
Collection
1. Comparison of Practice: South Korea and Switzerland
Several countries have determined that cellphone location records pro-
vide powerful tools for enforcement of COVID-19-related restrictions.
254
South Korea and Switzerland were among the first countries to deploy digi-
tal apps and use mobile phone location information for purposes of COVID-
19-related contact tracing and monitoring.
255
South Korea uses cellphone da-
ta to determine where individuals have been, to trace contacts of those ex-
posed or suspected of exposure to the virus, and to enforce adherence to 
252. See infra Part V.A.3 for an explanation of the legality, necessity, and proportionali-
ty standard regarding Article 17.
253. Matisse Barbaro, Government Interference with the Right to Privacy, 6 CAN. J.
HUM. RTS. 127, 128–29 (2017) (arguing that “non-arbitrary” surveillance is reasonable and 
proportional under the circumstances).
254. See Isobel Asher Hamilton, Compulsory Selfies and Contact-Tracing: Authorities 
Everywhere are Using Smartphones to Track the Coronavirus, and It’s Part of a Massive In-
crease in Global Surveillance, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.business
insider.com/countries-tracking-citizens-phones-coronavirus-2020-3?r=US&IR=T .
255. Id. (describing policies in South Korea); infra note 268 (describing policies in 
Switzerland).
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quarantines and stay-at-home orders.
256
South Korea permits relatively 
broad surveillance under its national laws.
257
South Korea changed its legal 
framework after the MERS health scare in 2015 to allow the government to 
gather and centrally control data from users’ cellphone locations that were 
previously privacy protected.
258
Now South Koreans are questioning wheth-
er too much information is being revealed in the course of contact tracing.
259
Among recent examples, revealing people’s late-night whereabouts in gay 
bars and publicly identifying visitors to so-called “love motels” has raised 
questions about privacy and adultery.
260
In explaining contact tracing 
measures, an official at the Korea Centers for Disease Control said the gov-
ernment starts with patient interviews but adds to the picture by using “GPS 
data, surveillance camera footage, and credit card transactions to recreate 
their route a day before their symptoms showed.”
261
Some have suggested 
South Korea’s public disclosure of infected people’s locations  violates non-
discrimination protections, given a May case in which a patron visiting gay 
nightclubs was outed as a source of new infections.
262
In contrast to these 
broad laws permitting electronic medical surveillance, telemedicine remains 
illegal in South Korea.
263
In Switzerland, authorities are using group data from mobile telephone 
carrier Swisscom to determine compliance with a national order limiting the 
size of public gatherings.
264
According to the Federal Office of Public 
Health, Swisscom has provided analysis to the Swiss government about sit-
uations in which twenty or more cellphone users are gathered.
265
The data 
indicates that far fewer Swisscom users are moving or gathering in large 
256. See Hyung Eun Kim, Coronavirus and Privacy: Are South Korea’s Alerts Too Re-
vealing? BBC (Mar. 5, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51733145; c.f. David 
Argente, The Costs of Privacy (Nat’l Bureau Econ.  Rsch., Working Paper No. 27220, 2020), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27220.pdf (illustrating the amount of detail shown by South 
Korean text alerts related to COVID contact tracing apps).
257. See Suk T. Lee, South Korea: Implementation and Application of Human Rights 
Covenants, 14 MICH. J. INT’L L. 705, 712–16 (1993).
258. See Kim, supra note 256; Steven Borowiec, How South Korea’s Nightclub Out-
break is Shining an Unwelcome Spotlight on the LGBT Community, TIME (May 14, 2020), 
https://time.com/5836699/south-korea-coronavirus-lgbtq-itaewon/.
259. Kim, supra note 256.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Don’t Rely on Contact-Tracing Apps, ECONOMIST (May 16, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/05/16/dont-rely-on-contact-tracing-apps.
263. Telemedicine Remains Illegal in South Korea, KOREA ECON. INST. AMERICA: THE 
PENINSULA, (May 15, 2020), http://blog.keia.org/2020/05/telemedicine-still-illegal-south-
korea/.
264. New Coronavirus: Evaluation of Anonymised Data on Gatherings, SWITZ. FED.
OFF.. PUB. HEALTH, (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/en/home/das-
bag/aktuell/news/news-26-03-2020.html.
265. Id.
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groups after the Swiss government limited the size of gatherings.
266
At the 
same time, the Swiss government took pains to emphasize that it was pro-
tecting data privacy and time-limiting its use of the information:
At no point do we receive location data from Swisscom, merely 
analyses and visualisations that Swisscom can generate from that 
data. The provisions of the Data Protection Act and the ethical 
principles that Swisscom follow in processing data are fully re-
spected. As soon as COVID-19 Ordinance 2 is abrogated, we will 
not be provided with any further analyses.
Swisscom’s Mobility Insights platform (based on Art. 45b of Tele-
communications Act) shows the approximate movements of all 
SIM cards in a given area (e.g. a cantons) over a certain time peri-
od. The analyses are based on approximate location details from the 
previous 24-hour period.
267
In response to privacy-related concerns, the Swiss health authorities up-
dated the information provided to the public, noting that the app “does not 
record data,” it works on a decentralized basis, “is designed to ensure ano-
nymity, and “meets the highest privacy protection requirements.”
268
2. Legality Suffers When States Rush to Adopt Digital 
Surveillance Apps
In both Switzerland and South Korea, the use of digital applications 
stemmed from legislative action where laws or regulations were adopted.
269
But for most states, the rush to adopt digital surveillance apps in response to 
COVID-19 feels like a free-for-all. Six months into the pandemic, at least 
thirty-seven states mandated digital applications or other surveillance for 
some locations or parts of their populations, such as those under quarantine; 
other states have encouraged the use of digital applications for COVID-19
surveillance on a voluntary basis.
270
The distinction between voluntary and 
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. New Coronavirus: SwissCovid App and Contact Tracing, SWITZ. FED. OFF. PUB.
HEALTH (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.bag.admin.ch/bag/en/home/krankheiten/ausbrueche-
epidemien-pandemien/aktuelle-ausbrueche-epidemien/novel-cov/swisscovid-app-und-contact-
tracing.html.
269. See Kim, supra note 256 (discussing South Korea); Evaluation of Anonymised Data 
on Gatherings, supra note 264 (discussing Switzerland); see also infra Part IV.A.1 for a dis-
cussion evaluating emergency measures under the ICCPR’s legality standard.
270. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (effective September 2020, “states” as de-
fined by the Tracker deploying surveillance include Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bulgaria, Brazil (city of Recife only), Cambodia, China, Ecuador, Grenada, Hong Kong, In-
dia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lichtenstein, Mexico, Mon-
tenegro, Nigeria, Oman, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, 
South Africa, State of Palestine, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey and the United Kingdom).
Fall 2020] Emergencies End Eventually 145
mandatory use of digital applications has been blurred by mandates from 
employers, local governments, and other authorities, raising questions about 
the legality of required use of digital apps.
271
Numerous European states started to employ telecom provider data to 
enforce their social distancing regulations early in their responses to 
COVID-19.
272
In addition, within twenty-four hours of it being offered, 
more than one million users in Australia downloaded a government-run sur-
veillance app using Bluetooth to monitor locations of those who had tested 
positive and trace their contacts.
273
The government has promised to stop us-
ing the app and wipe users’ personal data when the COVID-19 crisis 
ends.
274
While intrusive, these applications are examples of measures to 
combat COVID-19 that users voluntarily accept and that meet the legality 
standard.
Other states have failed to follow their own legal and regulatory proce-
dures in mandating citizens use digital applications or in authorizing tele-
phone companies to provide to the state information to monitor and enforce 
COVID-19-related quarantines, stay-at-home orders, and contact re-
strictions.  Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, for example, 
have adopted mandatory use of digital applications for quarantine enforce-
ment without a clear legal basis.
275
In some countries, including India, vol-
untary apps have been made mandatory for public employees or imposed as 
conditions for returning to work, sometimes without a legal basis for such 
conditions.
276
While the use of a mobile surveillance application in Israel 
was lawful according to emergency regulations, Israel’s Supreme Court 
ruled in April 2020 that the program of surveillance developed by the na-
tion’s internal security organization could not extend beyond May 1st  with-
271. See, e.g., New Guidelines on the measure to be taken by Ministries/Department of 
the Government of India, State/UT Government and State/UT authorities for the containment 
of COVID-19 in the country for an extended period of the National Lockdown for a further 
period of two weeks with effect from May 4, 2020. Order, No. 40-3/2020-DM-i(A) (May 1, 
2020) (India) [hereinafter India Order].
272. See Catherine Stupp, Europe Tracks Residents’ Phones for Coronavirus Research,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/europe-tracks-residents-phones-
for-coronavirus-research-11585301401.
273. See A. Odysseus Patrick, Australians Toss Aside Privacy Concerns in Rush to Sign 




275. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1; L. Libr. Cong, LL File No. 2020-019000, 
Regulating Electronic Means to Fight the Spread of COVID-19 163–64, 204 (2020); New 
‘Stay Home’ App Launched by DoH to Reinforce Self-Quarantine Procedures, Emirates News 
Agency (March 4, 2020), https://wam.ae/en/details/1395302834693. See also Mobile Location 
Data and COVID-19: Q&A, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (May 13, 2020), https://www.hrw.org
/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa.
276. See, e.g., Mobile Location Data and COVID-19: Q&A supra note 275; see also In-
dia Order supra note 271.
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out parliamentary approval.
277
The Court held that the executive branch 
could not legally extend the extensive surveillance program.
278
Ultimately 
following standards for legality, Israel’s parliament approved the program in 
May, allowed it to lapse, and then restarted digital surveillance in July after 
a new outbreak.
279
The surveillance today remains in place, with a parlia-
mentary imposed time limit at year’s end.
280
3. Necessity and Proportionality in the Context of Avoiding Arbitrary 
Interference with Privacy
Even in states that have taken precautions and used legislation or 
properly adopted regulations to impose digital health surveillance tools, the 
risks of overreach and long-standing damage to privacy rights remain of 
concern. To determine whether, on balance, a state’s measures that infringe 
on privacy are permissible, we have to first determine if Article 17’s limited 
right to freedom from “unlawful and arbitrary” interference with privacy has 
been triggered. This query, however, throws us almost immediately back to 
considering the secondary tests of necessity and proportionality.
Arbitrariness can be considered an element of a proportionality analysis 
as it centers on the link between the state’s reasoning for a restriction, the 
scope of the restriction, and the reasonableness of the measure for fighting 
COVID-19.
281
Digital surveillance is, by its nature, broad and can encom-
pass actors or circumstances beyond the originally intended scope.
282
In the 
context of terrorist surveillance, commentators have argued that blanket 
surveillance is inherently arbitrary.
283
Even worse, information gathered 
from surveillance is often transferred to police and other third parties, with 
277. See Fahim et al., supra note 267.
278. Elena Chachko, The Israeli Supreme Court Checks COVID-19 Electronic Surveil-
lance, LAWFARE, (May 5, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/israeli-supreme-court-checks-
covid-19-electronic-surveillance.
279. Craig Timberg, No Service: Cellphone Apps Designed to Track Covid-19 Spread 
Struggle Worldwide Amid Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/08/17/covid-tracking-apps-cellphones/.
280. Id.
281. See Van Hulst v. the Netherlands, supra note 78; see also Barbaro, supra note 253,
at 129.
282. See Coronavirus: States Use of Digital Surveillance Technologies to Fight Pan-
demic Must Respect Human Rights, ARTICLE19.ORG (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.article19.org
/resources/covid-19-states-use-of-digital-surveillance-technologies-to-fight-pandemic-must-
respect-human-rights/.
283. See, e.g., Barbaro, supra note 253, at 149 (stating “[f]ifth, surveillance and other 
measures that result in “blanket and indiscriminate” collection and storage of personal data 
should be prohibited insofar as they must be conceived as disproportionate.”); Scheinin, supra 
note 79, at para. 23 (stating “[t]he proportionality requirement in the limitations test to the 
right to privacy raises questions whether blanket stop and search powers in designated securi-
ty zones, such as in the Russian Federation or the United Kingdom, are really necessary in a 
democratic society.”) [internal citations omitted].
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little regard for the user’s privacy or consent to the transfer.
284
In the lan-
guage of proportionality, digital surveillance is arbitrary when it is not nar-
rowly tailored to the specific COVID-19-related objective being pursued.
285
In evaluating whether COVID-19-related restrictions on privacy are 
necessary, health authorities find different digital tools relatively more use-
ful at different phases of COVID-19 response.
286
For example, when states 
seek to flatten the curve and delay the spread of COVID-19, location data, 
which can assist in determining adherence to social distancing policies, is 
particularly useful.
287
At other stages of response, knowledge of an infected 
cellphone user’s proximity to others and details of whom she interacted with 
becomes important to contact tracing.
288
Sometimes analysis of anonymized 
data can aid policymaking, while in other cases—such as contact tracing—
knowledge about a named individual’s location, movements, and identities 
of those with whom the infected person came into contact are essential.
289
Thus, digital surveillance, in general, can be deemed necessary, but a more 
precise analysis would show that only some types of digital surveillance are 
necessary at corresponding phases of the pandemic.
With respect to proportionality, most essential data for combatting 
COVID-19 can be gathered in an anonymous form or, even if a link to an 
infected person is required, with applications that do not remove data from a 
user’s cellphone.
290
Moreover, once a national surveillance program begins 
to collect mobile telephone data and location information, is it necessary to 
supplement this data with additional privacy invasions from facial recogni-
tion artificial intelligence or credit card records, as in South Korea and 
elsewhere?
291
Bahrain, Jamaica, Kuwait, and Hong Kong require self-
isolating individuals to wear electronic bracelets to ensure they stay close to 
their mobile phone so as to enhance the effectiveness of mobile phone-
based surveillance.
292
Oman and Tunisia have gone even farther, deploying 
284. See infra Part VI. B.
285. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
286. Digital Contract Tracing Tools for COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Apr. 20, 2020) https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/digital-
contact-tracing.pdf.





290. See id. (explaining contact tracing).
291. See COVID-19: The Surveillance Pandemic, INT’L CTR. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.,
https://www.icnl.org/post/analysis/covid-19-the-surveillance-pandemic (last visited Sept. 28, 
2020) (citing Park Eui-rae, Corona 19, Second Concern About Excessive Disclosure of Priva-
cy, YONHAP NEWS (Mar. 9, 2020) https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20200309089000004).
292. IGA Begins Distribution of Electronic Bracelets Compatible with ‘BeAware’ App,
INFO. & E-GOV’T AUTH. NEWS (Apr. 4, 2020) http://www.iga.gov.bh/en/article/the-iga-
begins-distribution-of-electronic-bracelets-compatible-with-beaware-app (discussing electron-
148 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:105
drones and robots, respectively, to assist in COVID-19 monitoring and en-
forcement.
293
Less restrictive alternatives to broad digital surveillance pro-
grams that would cause less damage to privacy are available.
294
However 
states are not using these less-restrictive solutions that protect private infor-
mation. Rather, states are rushing to deploy new digital tools, often giving 
themselves and their telecommunications companies blanket authorization 
to collect and use cellphone users’ location data, proximity data and interac-
tion data, with little oversight.
295
Thus, many digital surveillance tools used 
for COVID-19 fail the proportionality test.
As examples, consider the following measures for contact tracing and 
digital surveillance that are designed or are being deployed in arbitrary, un-
necessary, or disproportionate ways. Cambodia’s April 10, 2020 State of 
National Emergency authorizes measures including “mobilizing military 
forces; surveilling telecommunications “by any means,” and banning or re-
stricting news media that may harm “national security,” or create confusion 




has deployed the Alipay Health 
Code application in more than 200 cities.
298
Alipay Health Code contains an 
algorithm that analyzes a user’s data, including uploaded information and 
information derived from locations and cellphone proximity to assign the 
user with a color code (red, yellow, or green like a stoplight) indicating their 
risk of COVID-19 transmission to others, and user data is shared with the 
police.
299
COVID-19 testing is not among the data the application can ac-
cess.
300
Media reports say the app will soon be required nationwide in Chi-
ic monitoring bracelets in Bahrain); see also COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching 
“surveillance” and “Hong Kong” or “Kuwait” or “Jamaica”).
293. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Oman” and “Tunisia”).
294. See fns. 338–49.
295. See COVID-19: The Surveillance Pandemic, supra note 291.
296. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Cambodia”); see also Rebecca 
Ratcliffe, Fears as Cambodia Grants PM Vast Powers Under COVID-19 Pretext, GUARDIAN,
(Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/10/fears-as-cambodia-grants-
hun-sen-vast-power-under-covid-19-pretext.
297. China has not ratified the ICCPR but has signed the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights whose Article 12 protects privacy in terms similar to ICCPR Article 17. Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, UN Doc. A/RES/217(III) art. 12 (Dec. 
10, 1948). For an argument why the ICCPR applies to surveillance by China, see James D. 
Fry, Privacy, Predictability and Internet Surveillance in the U.S. and China: Better the Devil
You Know? 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 419, at 433–37 (2015).
298. See Paul Mozur, Raymond Zhong & Aaron Krolik, In Coronavirus Fight, China 
Gives Citizens a Color Code, With Red Flags, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html.
299. See id.
300. See Yuan Yang & Nian Liu, China, Coronavirus and Surveillance: The Messy Re-
ality of Personal Data, FIN. TIMES (Apr.  2, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/760142e6-
740e-11ea-95fe-fcd274e920ca.
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na.
301
Again, such a broad program that does not link to COVID-19-testing 
data appears disproportionate to the privacy damage caused.
Democracies also are guilty of violating the proportionality test in their 
zeal to adopt digital tools to combat COVID-19. The province of Western 
Australia amended its Emergency Management Act, “allowing the govern-
ment to install surveillance devices in homes and direct people to wear mon-
itoring devices, in order to ensure that those required to quarantine do not 
interact with the community.”
302
South Korea’s aforementioned COVID-19
surveillance program has been questioned domestically because its use of 
credit card records and closed-circuit television monitoring goes beyond the 
mobile telephone surveillance authorized by law.
303
Lichtenstein uses elec-
tronic bracelets to enhance its mobile surveillance app with data sent direct-
ly to the mobile provider Swisscom.
304
B.  Privacy Violations from Failure to Protect Private 
Health Data
Any balancing test must compare the intrusiveness of digital COVID-
19 surveillance with the extent of harm. So, in essence, how serious is the 
damage to privacy from digital medical surveillance in response to the 
COVID-19 emergency? In addition to the initial privacy intrusion occurring 
when surveillance takes place, the data collected to combat COVID-19 is 
often passed on to other government agencies, law enforcement, private in-
surance companies and the general public, usually without again seeking the 
user’s explicit consent.
305
UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights and 
Counterterrorism Martin Scheinin underscored that absent strict adherence 
to ICCPR requirements of legality and time-limitation, COVID-19-related 
surveillance measures could irreversibly damage privacy related to health 
data:
Although privacy in principle is subject to a proportionality test al-
so in normal times, it is in my view different from the first set of 
rights just mentioned because of the risk of letting loose Orwellian 
surveillance in respect of highly sensitive personal health data. The 
risk of breaching the essential core of privacy rights is real.
306
301. See Mozur et. al., supra note 298.
302. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (citing Emergency Management Amendment 
(COVID-19 Response) Bill 2020 (WA) s 6 (Austl.)).
303. COVID-19: The Surveillance Pandemic, supra note 291.
304. COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Lichtenstein”).
305. See id.; see also Wendy K. Mariner, Reconsidering Constitutional Protection for 
Health Information Privacy, 18 J. CONST. L. 976, at 986–93 (2016).
306. Martin Scheinin, COVID-19 Symposium: To Derogate or Not to Derogate?, OPINIO 
JURIS (Apr. 6, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/04/06/covid-19-symposium-to-derogate-or-
not-to-derogate.
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Another commentator has said that mass collection and analysis of data 
“challenges international privacy laws in several ways: it casts doubt on the 
distinction between personal and non-personal data, clashes with data min-
imization, and undermines informed choice.”
307
1. Overview of Health Data Protection Standards
In fleshing out the legal basis for a right to protection of private data, 
the UN Special Rapporteur for the Protection of Human Rights While 
Countering Terrorism reported to the United Nations that data protection 
principles are “encapsulated in the right to privacy” under the Human 
Rights Committee’s General Comment 16.
308
Among the international core 
data protection provisions, he identifies as encapsulated by the right to pri-
vacy are obligations for states to:
• Obtain personal information fairly and lawfully;
• Limit the scope of its use to the originally specified purpose;
• Ensure that the processing is adequate, relevant and not exces-
sive;
• Ensure its accuracy;
• Keep it secure;
• Delete it when it is no longer required; and
• Grant individuals the right to access their information and re-
quest corrections.
309
Similar standards were set forth by the Special Rapporteur on the Right 
to Privacy in his 2019 consultations to establish a Draft Recommendation 
on the Protection of Health-Related Data.
310
That recommendation, pro-
duced by a Task Force created by the Special Rapporteur, was designed to 
establish “a common international baseline for minimum data protection 
standards for health-related data for implementation at the domestic level, 
and, to be a reference point for the ongoing debate on how the right to pri-
vacy can be protected in the context of health data.”
311
Among the rights, the 
Draft Recommendation sets forth with respect to health data are:
307. Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning? 3 INT’L
DATA PRIV. L. 74, 74 (2013).
308. Scheinin, supra note 79, ¶ 12 (citing Human Rights Committee General Comment 
No. 16).
309. Id. (citing Data Protection regulations of the Council of Europe, the OECD and the 
UN General Assembly).
310. See Mandate of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, 
Task Force on Privacy and the Protection of Health-Related Data, Draft Recommendation 
on the Use of Health-Related Protection and Data, Third Draft for Consultation, (Nov. 
2018), available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/SR_Privacy/Draft
RecommendationProtectionUseHealthRelatedData.pdf.
311. Id. ¶ 1.2.
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• A right to transparency in how, when and by whom one’s
health data is processed;
312
• Rights of access to, portability, rectification, erasure, and ob-
jection to the processing of health-related data;
313
• A right to informed consent prior to the processing or use of 
their health-related data.
314
Failure to adhere to these obligations can damage privacy through an 
inadequate focus on safe data storage, consent of users to use of their data, 
and protecting transfer of data collected for health purposes to law enforce-
ment or third parties who may use it for other unintended purposes.
315
In the COVID-19 crisis, states have rushed to deploy digital surveil-
lance so quickly that few of the data protection principles related to privacy 
have been followed.
316
Informed consent, for example, is not necessarily a 
focus of COVID-19-related surveillance.
317
Armenia passed a new law on 
March 31, 2020, providing the government with broad powers to track citi-
zens’ locations and movements using their cellphone data without the ex-
plicit permission of the person being monitored.
318
Even where consent is 
initially given, such as an individual voluntarily downloading a tracing app 
at the height of COVID-19 spread, later transfer of the data can violate in-
formed consent because the data passes on to a different user or for a differ-
ent purpose.
According to WHO guidelines on ethical issues in public health surveil-
lance, using unique anonymous identifiers and geo-masking are among the 
safeguards that should be deployed to avoid harm from public health sur-
veillance.
319
Data collected in the name of public health should never be 
shared for purposes unrelated to public health or for taking non-health ac-
tion against any person.
320
In addition, the WHO advises that oversight is 
key in the use of surveillance data, in collecting data that reveals stigma-
tized behavior and to maintain and preserve public trust.
321
States should ex-
ert special caution regarding the transfer of data to law enforcement agen-
312. Id. ¶ 11.
313. Id. ¶ 12.
314. Id. ¶ 5.1.a.
315. Scheinin, supra note 79, ¶ 12 (citing General Comment No. 16).
316. See infra Part V.A.2.
317. See Kerstin Vokinger, Digital Health and the COVID-19 Epidemic: An Assessment
Framework for Apps from an Epidemiological and Legal Perspective, SWISS MEDICAL 
WKLY. (May 17, 2020) https://smw.ch/article/doi/smw.2020.20282.
318. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Armenia”).
319. WHO Guidelines on Ethical Issues in Public Health Surveillance, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG. (2017); Q&A: Ethics in Public Health Surveillance, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 2017), 
http://www10.who.int/features/qa/surveillance-ethics/en/.
320. Id.
321. See id. at 27, 34, 37.
152 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:105
cies.
322
These WHO provisions also guide where and how a patient’s public 
health data should be restored after an emergency has passed. For example, 
the WHO calls for states to have a “compelling justification” for sharing 
identifiable data for non-public health uses in the WHO guidelines raises the 
specter that health, location, contacts or other surveillance data—once tak-
en—will be used again by governments or remain in the public domain 
where it can be exploited for other purposes.
323
It is no coincidence that counterterrorism surveillance provides one of 
the best parallels for a rigorous analysis of how health surveillance violates 
privacy. Governments often permit human rights infringements in response 
to both health and security emergencies.
324
Moreover, the combination of 
disease and terrorism-related concerns has led law enforcement and other 
security officials to gain broad access to massive health databases, which 
often include data collected for medical surveillance:
Nonetheless, before September 11, 2001, public health agencies 
had not persuaded the public to compel reporting of personally 
identifiable health information for all these purposes. The five 
deaths from anthrax letters sent in October 2001 fueled fears that
terrorists might use chemical or biological agents to attack the 
United States. The SARS epidemic in 2003 revived fears of natural 
epidemics. Both the possibility of bioterrorism and new natural ep-
idemics like avian influenza inspired new legislation to collect vast 
amounts of medical information in an attempt to detect cases in 
time to prevent the further spread of disease. . . . Public sentiment 
about providing personal information to the government or private 
companies has appeared to whipsaw between support in the name 
of preventing terrorism and opposition due to fears of government 
invasions of privacy. . . New information technology encourages 
both more surveillance and new uses for the data collected, from 
changing the environment to changing individual behavior. Surveil-
lance programs have traditionally been disease specific, but the pre-
sent federal attention to terrorism has been encouraging coordinated 
systems that link all types of health information in an electronic da-
tabase.
325
322. See id. at 46.
323. See id.
324. Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and Medical Priva-
cy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347, 347 (2007) (quoting City of Newark v. J.S., 652 A.2d 265, 271 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993)) [hereinafter Mariner, Mission Creep] (“The claim of ‘disease’ in a 
domestic setting has the same kind of power as the claim of ‘national security’ in matters re-
lating to foreign policy. Both claims are very powerful arguments for executive action. Both 
claims are among those least likely to be questioned by any other branch of government and, 
therefore, subject to abuse”).
325. Id. at 356–58 (internal citations omitted).
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2. Data Collected From COVID-19 Surveillance Harms Privacy After 
the Emergency Ends
As introduced above, a significant concern with COVID-19-inspired 
health surveillance data is that even if an initial intrusion on privacy is justi-
fied on balance, the privacy violation does not end when the COVID-19-
related emergency ends. Absent rigorous data protection, the information 
collected for stopping the spread of disease is likely to make its way into 
other government, law enforcement, or third-party uses, without consent of 
those being monitored.
326
This risk of unauthorized transfer existed before 
COVID-19’s outbreak but has expanded because of the rapid pace and 
scope at which COVID-19 surveillance data is collected, processed, and 
stored.
327
In considering other aspects of health surveillance, information 
initially collected to fight an epidemic is often later contained in databases 
whose primary purpose is health and financial management or research.
328
Moreover, the initial reason for allowing interference with privacy (consent 
of the patient or an overriding public health interest) has often changed or 
eroded by the time the data is included in other, different, down-stream da-
tabases.
329
A balancing analysis premised on avoiding arbitrary interference 
with privacy will be hard-pressed to conclude that broad use of data without 
sufficient safeguards is the least-restrictive alternative to achieve public 
health goals.
How might this type of privacy infringement due to data collection and 
storage have a practical impact with respect to COVID-19-inspired re-
strictions? A recent Human Rights Watch study indicated that the accumula-
tion of large amounts of data by governments through COVID-19-
surveillance apps risks use of that data for repression:
Other concerns include: restricting people’s movements based on 
arbitrary and opaque apps, as is the case in China; the lack of con-
sent to data being used, as is the case in Armenia, Israel, and South 
326. See id, at 358–60, 369.
327. See Wafa Ben-Hassine & Philip Dawson, 4 Rules to Stop Governments Misusing 
COVID-19 Tech After the Crisis, WORLD ECON. F., (May 15, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/covid-19-tech-data-usage-privacy/.
328. See Mariner, Mission Creep, supra note 324, at 358–60; see also Mariner, Recon-
sidering Constitutional Protection, supra note 305, at 986–93.
329. Mariner, Mission Creep, supra note 324, at 384 ( “[c]ourts in cases like Whalen and 
Danforth have limited their analyses to the justification for the initial collection of information 
– the first level of surveillance. The laws at issue in these first-generation cases did not con-
template secondary or tertiary reporting; courts had no need to consider re-disclosures other 
than accidental or negligent breaches of confidentiality at the first level. Yet it is the subse-
quent release of information to other public agencies and private entities that dominates the
structure of many current surveillance programs. Moreover, a program’s function can and of-
ten does change from level to level. If the different surveillance levels are not viewed inde-
pendently, the public health purpose of the first level of reporting may be conflated with the 
ultimate use of the data”).
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Korea; and the combination of mobile location data with other 
types of data, such as facial recognition, as is the case in Moscow. 
Almost all of the initiatives using location data to respond to 
COVID-19 involve placing large collections of data in the hands of 
governments, many of which have histories of repression and dis-
crimination against already marginalized communities, including 
religious minorities and political dissidents. Excessive interference 
with location privacy is a gateway to undue restrictions on other 
rights.
330
Other possibilities for unauthorized transfer of data or other violations 
of data privacy arise from the role of tech giants in the creation of digital 
apps to help track the spread of COVID-19.
331
In Nigeria, for example, the 
governors association has already initiated cooperation with the mobile tel-
ephone company to fight the pandemic that shares subscriber data unrelated 
to COVID-19.
332
Surveillance data could be coupled with other health in-
formation, for example information from fitness trackers in health apps, for 
malign purposes.
333
From such a starting point, it is not difficult to imagine 
security agencies using smartphone heart and pulse trackers to determine if 
suspected individuals show signs of nervousness and use that as a basis of 
criminal suspicion, interrogation, or evasion of quarantine.
334
Similarly, col-
lection of location data, credit card information, and CCTV footage could 
be combined with facial recognition and other artificial intelligence analysis 
to reveal details of personal movements and habits unrelated to any health 
interest.
335
Examples like Switzerland, where digital solutions to address COVID-
19 protect data privacy, constitute best practices and less restrictive means 
as alternatives to digital surveillance infringements.
336
Similarly, South Afri-
ca appears to have considered protecting privacy as part of a balancing 
analysis in revising its COVID-related regulations. In April, it repealed and 
330. Mobile Location Data and COVID-19: Q&A, HUM. RTS. WATCH, (May 13, 2020, 
12:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/13/mobile-location-data-and-covid-19-qa.
331. See Abrar Al-Heeti, Snowden Warns Government Surveillance Amid COVID-19
Could be Long Lasting, CNET (Mar. 26, 2020 2:31 PM), https://www.cnet.com
/news/snowden-warns-government-surveillance-amid-covid-19-could-be-long-lasting/.
332. COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Nigeria”).
333. Id.
334. See, e.g., COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (noting Iran’s mobile app claims to be 
able to diagnose COVID-19 using technology similar to that in health applications); Hanna 
Kozlowska, Our Obsession with Health-Tracking Technology is Great Evidence for Cops,
QUARTZ (Oct. 7, 2018), https://qz.com/1415879/our-obsession-with-health-tracking-
technology-is-great-evidence-for-cops/; Hamilton supra note 254.
335. See, e.g., Eun A Jo, South Korea’s Experiment in Pandemic Surveillance,
DIPLOMAT (Apr. 13, 2020), https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/south-koreas-experiment-in-
pandemic-surveillance/.
336. New Coronavirus: Evaluation of Anonymised Data on Gatherings, supra note 264.
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revised regulations under its Disaster Management Act to create a national 
COVID-19 Tracing Database which provides that data of contacts for all 
who have a positive COVID-19 test must be anonymized within six weeks 
of the end of the declared COVID Disaster.
337
Under ICCPR standards for 
proportionality, COVID-19-inspired restrictions that are not the least restric-
tive method for privacy infringement in use and handling of data fail a limi-
tations or a derogation analysis. One significant reason is that data privacy 
violations by their nature are likely to continue after the initial emergency, 
and the initial reason for the data collection ends.
C. Technology Offers Less Intrusive COVID-19 Surveillance Measures
Today, technology offers states a range of less-intrusive health surveil-
lance alternatives to address concerns about COVID-19-related data use, 
storage and transfer policies, and issues of informed consent. These include:
• Using privacy-protecting technologies, such as randomization 
of identifiers, secure hardware enclaves, secure multiparty 
computations, differentiated privacy, and homomorphic en-
cryption,
338
• Tailoring the surveillance information collected to the appro-
priate phase of disease protection and prevention being em-
ployed at the time by public health authorities,
339
• Data security, retention, and auditing policies, including storing 
data temporarily on the user’s phone or in anonymized or third-
party applications instead of on government or telecommunica-
tions provider servers, 
340
and
• Ensuring consent of the user to any transfer of the data beyond 
the initial purpose for which it was collected.
341
Moreover, a sophisticated merged understanding of technology, public 
health, and the law is necessary to come up with new solutions that protect 
337. COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “South Africa).
338. COVID-19: Using Mobile Phones & AI for Contact Tracing While Respecting Pri-
vacy, OTTER (Apr. 3, 2020, 10:06 AM), https://otter.ai/s/T_XbMSQ7SfGuG0dwXgX-TQ.
339. As the pandemic becomes less localized with more community spread, different 
information collection tools become more appropriate and individual information is less nec-
essary, except for contact tracing of specific individuals.  See e.g., Sera Whitelaw, Applica-
tions of Digital Technology in COVID-19 Pandemic Planning and Response, LANCET, (June 
29, 2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/landig/article/PIIS2589-7500(20)30142-
4/fulltext. (exploring the various information collection tools being used at various phases of 
pandemic preparedness and response). Yet others argue that location data of individual users 
is important for effective contact tracing, even if it results in a privacy violation. See Timberg, 
supra, note 279.
340. See, e.g., New Coronavirus: Evaluation of Anonymised Data on Gatherings, supra
note 264.
341. See, e.g., Ashkan Soltani et al., Contact Tracing Apps Are Not a Solution to the 
COVID-19 Crisis, BROOKINGS (Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/techstream
/inaccurate-and-insecure-why-contact-tracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster/.
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privacy while providing health authorities with valuable data for stopping 
epidemics like COVID-19. Governments, companies, and the tech commu-
nity are working together to come up with ways to protect privacy while al-
lowing data relevant to COVID-19 surveillance to be processed and used by 
governments.
342
But few measures deploy these safeguards. On the other 
hand, states are rolling out new apps on an almost daily basis around the 
world and giving themselves and their telecommunications companies au-
thorization to collect and use cellphone users’ location data, proximity data 
and interaction data, often without restriction.
343
The tech communities in Europe and the United States are pushing gov-
ernments to include data protection technologies in their COVID-19 re-
sponses, including the Pan European Privacy Preserving Proximity Tracing 
system.
344
Among the technologies that are being deployed are randomiza-
tion of identifiers, secure hardware enclaves, secure multiparty computa-
tions, differentiated privacy, and homomorphic encryption.
345
Stakeholders 
ranging from the UN’s International Telecommunications Union to the 
World Economic Forum have proposed that privacy-enhancing technologies 
should be used to prevent abuse of private data, which has been placed in 
the hands of governments during the emergency response to COVID-19.
346
One widely discussed solution stems from a Google-Apple cooperation 
project which uses Bluetooth in both Apple and Android cellphones to sup-
port contact-tracing.
347
Unlike others, the Google-Apple collaboration saves 
tracking information on a user’s phone, rather than on government-accessed 
servers.
348
This decentralized data storage better protects privacy and seems 
to be a reasonable balance in line with the principles of necessity and pro-
portionality. Six months into the pandemic, studies question whether any 
contact tracing apps have helped to control the spread of the virus, but at 




343. See, e.g., id.
344. COVID-19: Using Mobile Phones & AI for Contact Tracing While Respecting Pri-
vacy, supra note 338; see, e.g., Timberg, supra, note 279.
345. See generally BIGDATA UN GLOB. WORKING GRP. UN HANDBOOK ON PRIVACY-
PRESERVING COMPUTATION TECHNIQUES, (2019), http://publications.officialstatistics.org
/handbooks/privacy-preserving-techniques-handbook/UN%20Handbook%20for%20Privacy-
Preserving%20Techniques.pdf.
346. Samantha Stein, How to Restore Data Privacy After the Coronavirus Pandemic, WORLD 
ECON. F., (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/03/restore-data-privacy-
after-coronavirus-pandemic/; Ben-Hassein, supra note 327.
347. Some Countries Want Central Databases for Contact-Tracing Apps, ECONOMIST, 
(Apr. 30, 2020) https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/04/30/some-countries-want-central-
databases-for-contact-tracing-apps.
348. Id.
349. See Timberg, supra note 279.
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UN human rights monitors and interested civil society groups have of-
fered interesting proposals to better protect privacy rights in the face of 
modern surveillance and the spread of health data across uncontrolled data-
bases. For example, a group of more than 100 civil society organizations 
signed a joint statement April 2nd, calling on governments to ensure their 
surveillance practices were strictly necessary and tailored to health needs 
identified by public health professionals.
350
Their joint statement proposed 
seven preventive and protective measures for COVID-19-related surveil-
lance. These include:
• Ensuring surveillance measures are lawful, necessary, and pro-
portionate and provided for by law.
• Expanded surveillance powers should be time-limited and end 
after the pandemic pressure decreases.
• Data collection should be used only for COVID-19 response 
and no other government purpose.
• Digital safety and personal data must be protected in the pro-
cess of pandemic response.
• Any use of digital surveillance or AI must address the risk that 
marginalized populations are discriminated against or inaccu-
rately characterized or targeted.
• Data sharing agreements that governments enter into must be 
based on law and disclosed in a manner to allow public over-
sight, sunsetting, and other safeguards.
• Government should ensure that health authorities, not domestic 
or international intelligence agencies, handle and control the in-
formation collected by COVID-19-related surveillance and ef-
fective remedies must exist for misuse and error.
• Public health experts and marginalized populations are among 
the stakeholders that should be consulted in COVD-19 related 
data collection and surveillance programs.
351
The difficulty of coordinating fast-moving technology changes for the 
protection of privacy with the evolving responses of legal and health profes-
sionals in dealing with the virus is another significant reason why states 
should consider COVID-19-related restrictions on privacy based on deroga-
tion from the ICCPR, rather than a limitations analysis. Our legal and health 
framework would benefit from constant reassessment given the rapid 
change in the scientific knowledge about the virus, its various stages, and 
the best ways to combat the virus at each of these stages. Moreover, states 
must have a sufficient understanding of the privacy-protecting technologies 
available and must incentivize surveillance and digital app designers to pro-
350. Joint Statement States Use of Digital Surveillance Technologies to Fight Pandemic 
Must Respect Human Rights, ALGORITHM WATCH (Apr. 2, 2020), https://algorithmwatch.org
/en/joint-statement-pandemic-surveillance-tech-and-human-rights/.
351. Id.
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tect privacy. A one-time limitations analysis that determines a privacy in-
fringement caused by digital surveillance is permitted, because it was not 
arbitrary under Article 17, threatens to be quickly out of date and does a dis-
service to the rapid advances in privacy-enhancing technology which can 
permit strong digital responses to COVID-19 without infringing privacy 
rights.
VI. IMPROVING LIMITATIONS ANALYSES OF COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS 
ON FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY
COVID-19-inspired restrictions on public gatherings, which in many 
nations limit the number of individuals outside the same household who can 
meet at one time or place, create interesting challenges under the ICCPR, 
particularly under Article 21 on Freedom of Assembly. These limitations 
impact public protests, church and other religious gatherings, opportunities 
for political candidates to campaign, and for voters to cast ballots, cultural, 
sports and recreational activities, and many other elements of social and po-
litical life. Many citizens seem to have accepted the balancing decision that 
governments have made for them—agreeing to temporary limitations on 
their exercise of rights in the interest of “preserving life.”
352
In other cases, 
citizens protest and vocally object to COVID-19-inspired restrictions and
demand a return to economic and social life without these public health 
measures.
353
This section argues that analyses governments have undertaken with re-
spect to freedom of assembly, if any, have been incomplete or insufficient, 
and suggests additional factors states may use to conduct more thorough 
limitations analyses. This section makes four primary points. First, a balanc-
ing between public health and other rights is clearly contemplated under Ar-
ticle 21, but states should not weigh all competing rights equally. The stand-
ard of the ICCPR prioritizes avoiding restrictions that impact a democratic 
society. So, COVID-19-related restrictions that infringe political protests 
and elections deserve more strict scrutiny than restrictions interfering with 
sporting or cultural events. Second, governments should draw lessons from 
European and U.S. legal doctrines, which emphasize that restrictions on as-
semblies should be viewpoint neutral and should maintain the ability of an 
assembly to reach its intended audience. Third, modern society offers a 
range of online alternatives, which could make restrictions more or less nec-
essary and proportionate. States should explicitly consider the availability of 
352. See, e.g., Raphaella Stavrinou, Public Opinion in Italy, Spain, France in Favour of 
Lockdown Measures, NEW EUR., (March 26, 2020, 6:56 PM), https://www.neweurope.eu
/article/public-opinion-in-italy-spain-france-in-favour-of-lockdown-measures; Ted Van Green 
& Alec Tyson, Five Facts About Partisan Reaction To COVID-19 in the US, PEW RSCH. CTR.  
(April 2, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/04/02/5-facts-about-partisan-
reactions-to-covid-19-in-the-u-s.
353. See, e.g., infra fns. 409–416 (discussing Michigan protests).
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online alternatives, where relevant, and the impact of Internet shutdowns on 
other freedoms during a pandemic. Finally, we conclude that a derogations-
based approach for justifying COVID-19-related restrictions on freedom of 
assembly is preferable to a limitations-based one. All emergency restrictions 
should eventually come to an end, an outcome more easily assured under a 
derogations analysis than under a limitations analysis.
A. Limitations Analyses, If Any, Appear to Have Been Conducted 
Superficially
According to the COVID-19 Tracker, at least 110 nations have imposed 
freedom of assembly restrictions due to COVID-19 as of September 2020 
354
Of those, ten percent involved legislation, with most other restrictions im-
posed by executive order or regulation.
355
There is little evidence that offi-
cials analyzed the ICCPR standards of legality, necessity, and proportionali-
ty in detail in designing these restrictions.
356
Despite the lack of evidence of 
any rigorous analysis, we assume
357
that the regulations of assemblies meet 
the legality test and assume the responsible officials believed that some lim-
it on public gatherings was necessary to protect the lives and capacity of 
their health systems from the virus.
358
Assessing proportionality, however, is more complicated. The only UN 
Special Rapporteur to formally report on health-based limitations on human 
rights in pandemics since the COVID-19 outbreak essentially merged the 
necessity and proportionality tests.
359
He noted:
[U]nder the necessity principle, when a State invokes a legitimate 
ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must establish a 
354. COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1.
355. Id. Cambodia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greenland, Hungary, Ireland, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, N. Macedonia, South Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom 
adopted national legislation, while Ethiopia and Nigeria imposed restrictions on assemblies 
via legislation at state-level. Others in the database imposed restrictions based on executive 
order, regulation, or practice. While not in the Tracker, Papua New Guinea also passed a law 
giving the government Controller broad authority to restrict movement, assemblies and most 
aspects of public life.  See National Pandemic Act of 2020, Papua New Guinea National Par-
liament (June 12, 2020), https://covid19.info.gov.pg/files/June2020/18062020/National
%20Pandemic%20Act%202020-%28Certified%29.pdf;
356. See, e.g., Neil Jarman & Simona Ogenovska, Protest in Time of Pandemic, EUR.
CENT. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L., (last accessed May 28, 2020), https://ecnl.org/protest-in-time-of-
pandemic/ (arguing European assembly restrictions are haphazard with no standard for the 
number of people permitted to gather or time-length of restrictions).
357. See supra text accompanying fns. 66–70.
358. COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Assemblies”).
359. See, e.g., COVID-19 and Special Procedures, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (last visited May 29, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies
/SP/Pages/COVID-19-and-Special-Procedures.aspx (Special Rapporteur David Kaye was the 
first UN Special Rapporteur to file a formal report related to the pandemic. Numerous rappor-
teurs have produced unofficial reports).
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direct and immediate connection between the expression and the 
threat said to exist. It is the State’s obligation to demonstrate neces-
sity, not a complainant’s obligation to demonstrate its failure. The 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights – that, to meet 
the test of necessity, any restriction must be something more than 
“useful,” “reasonable,” or “desirable”—is the correct one. Necessi-
ty implies proportionality, according to which restrictions must tar-
get a specific objective and not unduly intrude upon other rights of 
targeted persons, and the ensuing interference with third parties’
rights must be limited and justified in the light of the interest sup-
ported by the intrusion (A/HRC/29/32, ¶ 35). The restriction must 
be the least intrusive instrument among those which might achieve 
the desired result.
360
We consider COVID-19-inspired assembly restrictions under these tests 
below and suggest improvements for states to use in their balancing anal-
yses.
B. A Rigorous Limitations Analysis Should Draw Lessons from Article 
21, Jurisprudence on Protest Limitations, and Online Alternatives in 
Modern Society
In considering restrictions on freedom of assembly, we suggest states 
should, in the future, consider the following factors in assessing a re-
striction’s proportionality. First, ICCPR Article 21’s standard—that a re-
striction must be necessary in a democratic society—prioritizes certain 
types of assemblies in balancing public health interests against human 
rights. The ICCPR language suggests an intent to minimize limitation on 
rights key to democratic expressions—such as those related to policy issues, 
protest messages, and elections—over gatherings for sporting or cultural 
purposes.
361
Standards adopted by the General Comments and other second-
ary sources under-emphasize this link to democratic expression.
362
In the 
case of COVID-19-related restrictions, limitations that impact the rights 
necessary for democratic expression should be strictly scrutinized. In effect, 
this suggests that restrictions for public health may fail a limitations balanc-
ing analysis and would be better imposed as emergency derogations with 
limited life-span.
Second, in a proper analysis of COVID-19-related restrictions, states 
might consider the type of balancing European and U.S. law has applied to 
freedom of assembly and public protest in a non-health context. In these ju-
360. David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression), Disease Pandemics and the Freedom of Opinion and 
Expression ¶ 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/44/49 (Apr. 23, 2020) (internal citations omitted).
361. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 21.
362. See General Comment No. 37, supra note 60, ¶ 40.
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risdictions, time, place, and manner restrictions are permitted in certain cir-
cumstances but must be applied to maximize the opportunity for the under-
lying message of an assembly to reach the intended audience—often law-
makers or other politicians. The Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (“OSCE”), for example, considers whether a protest is taking 
place within sight and sound of the policymakers who are its intended audi-
ence.
363
Finally, states should consider the availability of online alternatives 
to assemblies that are important in a democracy.
364
While this range of 
online alternatives was unavailable when the ICCPR was drafted, any pro-
portionality test applied today should consider the specific type and nature 
of online alternatives, especially as they impact freedom of assembly.
1. “Necessary in A Democratic Society” From the ICCPR’s History
Analysis of bans on public gatherings and other COVID-19-inspired re-
strictions affecting freedom of assembly under IHRL is complicated by the 
intention of drafters in the negotiating history of ICCPR Articles 21 and 22 
requiring that any restriction be “necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of . . . public health.”
365
It appears from the negotiating history of 
the ICCPR that the point inserted into the Covenant by the states advocating 
for restrictions to be “necessary in a democratic society” was more a politi-
cal point about the link between assembly related rights and democratic ac-
tivity than a legal one. The Travaux Préparatoires state:
Article 17 (Right of peaceful assembly) Formulation of the right. 
The debate on article 15 that took place at the Commission’s 325th 
meeting was concerned with the purposes of, and limitations on, the 
right of peaceful assembly. Many representatives regarded the sec-
ond sentence of the article as a satisfactory specification of the 
limitations that were desirable. Some representatives thought there 
was room for improvement and suggested the revision of the cata-
logue of limitations by adding public safety, public health instead 
of health simply the prevention of disorder or crime, and the 
maintenance of order, as some of the criteria by which the necessity 
of allowable legislative limitations should be judged. A number of 
representatives said it was of fundamental importance that limita-
363. See Nina Belyaeva, Thomas Bull, David Goldberger, Michael Hamilton, Neil Jar-
man, Muatar S. Khaidarova, Sergei Ostaf, Vardan Poghosyan, Alexander Vashkevich & 
Yevgeniy Zhovtis (Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe Panel of Experts on 
Freedom of Assembly), Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (2
nd
ed., 2010) [herein-
after Freedom of Peaceful Assembly], at 17 § 3.4-3.5.  infra text accompanying fns. 402–405
(discussing U.S. standards for time, place, and manner restrictions.
364. See generally Amy E. Cattle, Digital Tahrir Square: An Analysis of Human Rights
and the Internet Examined Through the Lens of the Egyptian Arab Spring, 26 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 417, 449 (2016).
365. ICCPR, supra note 4 at art. 21–22.
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tions on the right to peaceful assembly should be allowed only 
where they were necessary in a democratic society. Other repre-
sentatives contended that the right itself should serve the interests 
of democracy and that any exercise of the right running counter to 
democratic principles should be prohibited and penalized. The pro-
ponents of that view argued that the aim should meet with universal 
approval among the members of the Commission and also that it 
was consonant with the very principles and purposes of the United 
Nations. Some representatives, however, opposed the linking either 
of the right of peaceful assembly or of the limitations thereon to 
democratic principles, since it was difficult to find any practical 
definition of the term “democracy” that would meet with universal 
acceptance and, furthermore, since none of the limitations in the 
covenant should be used for the extirpation of any philosophies or 
political beliefs, however detestable or obnoxious they might be, 
unless the exercise of the right of peaceful assembly by groups 
avowing such.
366
This discussion in the Travaux Préparatoires suggests that state repre-
sentatives highly valued the connection between the right to peaceful as-
sembly and democratic expressions of political views. They specified that 
the ICCPR should not permit limitations that impede assemblies important 
to a democracy. The political nature of this argument is enhanced by the fact 
that language about limitations on freedom of assembly being necessary in a 
democratic society was added to the ICCPR Article by the narrowest of 
margins in a nine to eight vote, which split on ideological lines.
367
In attempting to interpret the “necessary in a democratic society” clause 
of the ICCPR, some secondary sources oversimplified the political point be-
ing emphasized by the drafters. Clearly, an ideological battle between de-
mocracy and other forms of government was underway in 1966 when the 
ICCPR was adopted. Proponents of democracy had prevailed in World War 
II and held the majority in the UN at the time of the ICCPR vote, but the 
Cold War-era blocs had formed.
368
Democratic states largely supported the 
ICCPR, while those in the Soviet-bloc supported the ICESCR, and non-
aligned states like India and Yugoslavia supported elements of both trea-
366. Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 63, paras. 21–22.
367. Id. The insertion of the words “in a democratic society,” proposed by France 
(E/CN.4/L.201), was adopted 9 to 8, with 1 abstention.
368. See Nico Schrijver, Fifty Years International Human Rights Covenants. Improving 
the Global Protection of Human Rights by Bridging the Gap Between the Two Covenants,  
41TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS [TVR] 457, 458 (2016); Daniel Tarantola, A 
Perspective on the History of Health and Human Rights: From the Cold War to the Gold War,
29 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y, 42, 42-53. (discussing right to health in ideological context of Cold 
War).
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ties.
369
In the context of the ICCPR discussion of the term “necessary in a 
democratic society,” these non-aligned states assiduously abstained and ar-
gued that democracy was not sufficiently well defined.
370
But that position 
was defeated in the final vote on the article, and again in the amendment, as 
the position of democratic states in the Western bloc prevailed.
371
Finally, in considering the standard for deciding whether a restriction is 
“necessary in a democratic society,” the UN Human Rights Committee’s
General Comment 37 suggests that a limitation on freedom of assembly un-
der Article 21 must, inter alia:
372
• Be considered imperative, in the context of a society based on 
democracy, political pluralism, and human rights, as opposed 
to being merely reasonable or expedient;
• Be the least intrusive among the measures that might serve the 
relevant protective function. Establishing whether a restriction 
is necessary requires a factual assessment;
• Be proportionate, which requires . . . balancing the nature and 
the extent of the interference against the reason for interfering.
This approach substitutes for the “necessary in a democratic society”
standard legal tests of proportionality and least restrictive means, which 
were not necessarily intended in negotiating the ICCPR. Viewed in this 
light, it appears the first test proposed by the General Comment—whether a 
limitation is “considered imperative, in the context of a society based on 
democracy, political pluralism, and human rights”—is the most consistent 
with the underlying view of states negotiating the treaty. It is also the most 
closely linked to the language of Article 21.
369. Schrijver supra note 368; see also THE HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS AT 50 23-26 
(Daniel Moeckli & Helen Keller eds., 2018).
370. See Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 63, at paras. 249–50. (Some representatives, 
however, opposed the linking either of the right of peaceful assembly or of the limitations 
thereon to democratic principles, since it was difficult to find any practical definition of the 
term “democracy” that would meet with universal acceptance and, furthermore, since none of 
the limitations in the covenant should be used for the extirpation of any philosophies or politi-
cal beliefs, however detestable or obnoxious they might be, unless the exercise of the right of 
peaceful assembly by groups avowing such philosophies fell unmistakenly within one of the 
types of activity that the State would be permitted, under the statement of limitations already 
contained in the article, to prohibit or restrain. In favor: Egypt, Pakistan, Poland, Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay. Against: Australia, 
Belgium, Chile, China, France, Greece, Lebanon, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, United States of America. Abstaining: India, Yugoslavia.”) (emphasis 
added).
371. Id.
372. General Comment No. 37, supra note 60, ¶ 40.
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2. Impact of COVID-19-Related Restrictions on Rights Necessary to 
Democracy
Analyzing whether a given restriction is necessary and justified in a 
democratic society inherently poses its own balancing test based on the facts 
of the restriction and the application of that restriction to assemblies, which 
are expressing various viewpoints and opinions of relevance to democratic 
debate.
373
The “proportionality” analysis advanced by secondary sources 
such as the Siracusa principles suggests analyzing a restriction by focusing 
on the objective being sought to protect through the restriction—here, the 
benefit to public health. In the case of COVID-19 related restrictions on 
freedom of assembly, large gatherings could rationally impact public 
health.
374
But the original terms of the ICCPR and its history suggest that the 
Covenant and Article 21, in particular, focused on how a given legal re-
striction would impact rights central to a democracy.
375
In this way, the 
ICCPR prioritizes certain rights as having greater weight than others in a 
proper balancing analysis.
How would this apply in practice? The lawfulness of COVID-19 re-
sponse measures depends on many factual questions about how the re-
striction was adopted, how it is being deployed, and what activity is being 
limited. Is the restriction being deployed on a neutral basis across the board, 
or is freedom of assembly or other political activity specifically targeted by 
the limitation?
376
For example, is the restriction being deployed, as it poten-
tially was in Poland, to limit participation in an election?
377
Is it being de-
ployed to limit the ability of protesters to complain about a political issue? 
Is it, as in recent protests in the United States, part of a debate about the im-
pact of COVID-19-inspired restrictions themselves?
378
Can bans on public 
gatherings deny the right to work, or similarly, can they keep workers from 
striking over, for example, inadequate protective gear or failure to grant 
premium pay to healthcare workers treating those with the virus? What if 
the ban is being deployed to limit another protected ICCPR right, such as 
religious freedom? Or is it deployed as a pretext to push demonstrators off 
the streets? In balancing the extent of a state’s interest in the protection of 
373. See S. Bay Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613–14 (2020) (Rob-
erts concurring) (emphasized the judiciary lacks the background, competence and expertise to 
second-guess public health decisions and stating “when restrictions on particular social activi-
ties should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and fact-intensive matter.”).
374. Id.
375. See ICCPR supra note 4, art. 21; see also Travaux Préparatoires, supra note 63,
paras. 248–50.
376. COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Albania”)(an executive order provid-
ed a ban and fines for all gatherings, specifically mentioning political gatherings).
377. See COVID-19 and Special Procedures, supra note 359 (stating that the ‘principles 
of non-discrimination, participation, empowerment and accountability in particular needs to 
be applied. Particular attention should be paid to people in vulnerable situations”).
378. See id.
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public health, is it relevant to how serious the risk of infection is in the loca-
tion where the assembly is to take place? For example, should an election be 
permitted to go forward in a relatively isolated area of a country where the 
virus has not yet spread, whereas it might be lawful to postpone or cancel a 
similar gathering for an election in New York City or another metropolis 
where hospitals threaten to be overwhelmed by the disease? Many of these 
questions are at the heart of an analysis of whether a restriction is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interest of public health.
These fact patterns are not hypothetical but have already emerged in the 
months since COVID-19 erupted into our social and political lives. Elec-
tions have been conducted, for example, in South Korea and some U.S. 
states, but more often they have been delayed, as in Poland, New Zealand 
and many U.S. state presidential primaries.
379
In Burundi and Guinea, dicta-
tors are reportedly proceeding with elections because they know COVID-19
will keep election observers away.
380
Protests against COVID-19-related 
stay-at-home orders have occurred in many U.S. states: Most have been 
permitted, but some have been at least partially dispersed by police.
381
U.S. 
authorities may also have misused COVID-19 measures in policing protests 
sparked by the death of George Floyd in police custody.
382
Health care 
379. See Choe Sang-Hun, In South Korea Vote, Virus Delivers Landslide Win to Gov-
erning Party, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/15
/world/asia/south-korea-election.html. (stating despite being one of the first states to face seri-
ous infection and restrictions as a result of COVID-19 South Korea held national elections for 
Parliament on April 15, 2020); Nick Corasaniti & Stephanie Saul, 16 States Have Post-
poned Primaries During the Pandemic. Here’s a List., N.Y. TIMES, (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/article/2020-campaign-primary-calendar-coronavirus.html (Similar-
ly, 16 U.S. states delayed presidential primaries because of the risk of COVID-19 transmis-
sion and regulations limiting public gatherings); Joanna Berendt & Marc Santora, Pandemic 
Forces Poland to Delay Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES, (May 7, 2020),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/07/world/europe/poland-presidential-election-
coronavirus.html (Poland’s May 10 Presidential election was delayed because of COVID-19-
related restrictions and political debate about whether the election delay gave the incumbent a 
greater opportunity to campaign on state-dominated television while the opposition has been 
unable to campaign during the virus lockdown); Damien Cave, New Zealand Election 
Delayed Amid New Coronavirus Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/17/world/asia/new-zealand-election-coronavirus.html
380. Covid-19 Helps Ballot-Dodgers in Africa, ECONOMIST, (May 16, 2020),
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2020/05/16/covid-19-helps-ballot-
dodgers-in-africa.
381. See Manny Fernandez, Conservatives Fuel Protests Against Coronavirus Lock-
downs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/us/texas-protests-
stay-at-home.html (Protesting in Michigan and Texas were partially restricted by police en-
forcing stay-at-home orders, while other parts of those protests went forward uneventfully. 
Other demonstrations against COVID-19-inspired stay-at-home orders have taken place in 
Ohio, Indiana, Nevada and Maryland, often under the “You Can’t Close America” banner 
used in Austin, Texas).
382. See Robinson Meyer, The Protests Will spread the Coronavirus, ATLANTIC (June 1, 
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/06/protests-pandemic/612460/ (citing 
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workers from New York to Malawi have staged public protests over a lack 
of protective gear, and Amazon closed its operations in France after French 
authorities responded to worker protests by threatening to level heavy fines 
against the company.
383
In Iraqi Kurdistan, public workers protesting with-
holding of salaries were arrested, along with a journalist, under a COVID-
19 law banning public gatherings.
384
India’s police used a COVID-19 ban on 
public gatherings as an excuse to break up a months-long sit-in protesting a 
citizenship law as discriminating against Muslims.
385
COVID-19-related restrictions on freedom of assembly that interfere 
with democratic activity and expression should be viewed with suspicion in 
a proper balancing analysis under Article 21’s limitation clause. The ICCPR 
drafters emphasized that limitations on assemblies that impede democratic
debate merit greater scrutiny than restrictions on mass gatherings in gen-
eral.
386
In the context of COVID-19, restrictions on the assembly which im-
pede elections and interfere with protests over the very restrictions at issue 
during the pandemic are among those meriting such scrutiny. Protests about 
the extent and length of stay-at-home orders, pay and treatment of workers 
during COVID-19, and their impacts on the economy are similarly im-
portant topics for democracies to debate in order to reach sound policy deci-
sions. Denmark’s law implementing COVID-19 restrictions, discussed in 
the following section of this article, calls these “opinion-shaping protests”
and exempts them from restrictions on freedom of assembly.
387
Is the protec-
tion of these rights more important than the protection of religious assem-
blies or cultural performances? The language of Article 21 and the context 
of the ICCPR’s drafting seems to prioritize public assemblies relevant to 
democratic activity. As such, a proper limitations analysis should not bal-
ance all ICCPR rights equally in permitting COVID-19-related health re-
strictions but rather should scrutinize more strictly restrictions limiting as-
Georgetown professor of health law Alexandra Phelan claiming that pretextual use of public 
health to justify arrests of civil rights activists was a motivating factor for the Siracusa princi-
ples, and alleging that crowd control and imprisonment practices used in response to the 
George Floyd protests violate international law).
383. See Charles Pensulo, Malawi Health Workers Protest Against Lack of Protective 
Gear, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 14, 2020) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/malawi-health-
workers-protest-lack-protective-gear-200414165616071.html; Adam Jeffery, Healthcare 
Workers Protest for Vital Protection Equipment, CNBC (Apr. 18, 2020), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/18/healthcare-workers-protest-for-vital-protection-
equipment.html (photos from nurses protests across the United States); Mathieu Rosemain &
Gwénaëlle Barzic, Amazon to Close French Warehouse Until Next Week After Court Order,
REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-amazon-
france/amazon-to-close-french-warehouses-until-next-week-after-court-order-
idUSKCN21X192.
384. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Iraq”).
385. See id. (searching “India”).
386. ICCPR supra note 4, art. 21 (“necessary in a democratic society”).
387. See COVID-19 Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Denmark”).
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semblies crucial to elections or public debate, including debates on the 
democratic nature and permissibility of COVID-19-related restrictions 
themselves.
3. Lessons from National Jurisprudence on Limiting Public Assemblies
From the previous examples, the type of assembly and message it pro-
motes clearly are relevant to a limitations-based balancing, even when pub-
lic health protections are at issue. One could argue that temporary health re-
strictions should yield for elections, important public dissent, debate or 
manifestation about the emergency measures themselves, and other group 
activity necessary in a democratic society. If public health restrictions on 
assemblies should be evaluated based on their impact on certain types of 
democratic expression, it would also make sense for legislatures and offi-
cials to consider domestic jurisprudence specific to restrictions on freedom 
of assembly.
European examples offer some instructive factors. For example, the 
OSCE developed guidelines in 2006 on freedom of peaceful assembly, ar-
ticulating important principles for limitations.
388
These include a presump-
tion in favor of permitting peaceful assemblies, a state’s positive obligation 
to facilitate and protect peaceful assemblies, good administration and ac-
countability in government conduct regulating assemblies, and principles of 
legality, proportionality, and non-discrimination.
389
The last of these OSCE 
elements parallels the Siracusa Principles’ and General Comments’ efforts 
at harmonizing ICCPR language into legal tests.
390
Interestingly, the OSCE 
guidelines offer five additional criteria for consideration:
3.1 Legitimate grounds for restriction. The legitimate grounds for 
restriction are prescribed in international and regional human rights 
instruments. These should not be supplemented by additional 
grounds in domestic legislation.
3.2 Public space. Assemblies are as legitimate uses of public space 
as commercial activity or the movement of vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic. This must be acknowledged when considering the necessity 
of any restrictions.
3.3 Content-based restrictions. Assemblies are held for a common
expressive purpose and, thus, aim to convey a message. Re-
strictions on the visual or audible content of any message should 
face a high threshold and should only be imposed if there is an im-
minent threat of violence.
3.4 “Time, place and manner” restrictions. A wide spectrum of pos-
sible restrictions that do not interfere with the message communi-
388. See generally Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, supra note 363.
389. Id. at 15–17.
390. See id.; c.f. supra Section II.B.2.
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cated is available to the regulatory authority. Reasonable alterna-
tives should be offered if any restrictions are imposed on the time, 
place or manner of an assembly.
3.5 “Sight and sound.” Public assemblies are held to convey a mes-
sage to a particular target person, group or organization. Therefore, 
as a general rule, assemblies should be facilitated within “sight and 
sound” of their target audience.
391
We will consider each of these in turn, as applied to COVID-19-related 
health restrictions that impact freedom of assembly.
The question of Section 3.1 of the OSCE’s guidelines on whether a le-
gitimate ground for restriction exists is answered affirmatively by ICCPR 
Article 21. Public health is a specific legitimate grounds for restriction 
acknowledged in articles of the ICCPR.
392
Section 3.2’s concern that public 
space be protected for both commercial and political assemblies suggests 
that as public space reopens for commerce and traffic, it should similarly 
reopen for assemblies seeking to deliver a political message.
393
Likewise, 
Section 3.4’s guidance related to reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions reinforces our advice that legislatures consider alternatives, both 
online and offline.
394
Section 3.3’s focus not to “interfere with the message” conveyed by an 
assembly
395
strikes at the heart of factors governments should consider in a 
proper limitations balancing analysis of COVID-19-related restrictions on 
assemblies. Under the ICCPR, the balance must rest in favor of permitting 
expression, especially expression related to issues in a democratic society.
396
Respecting Section 3.3’s concern about not restricting the content of assem-
bly messages is extremely challenging in the context of COVID-19. Certain 
aspects of content are key in deciding whether to permit a restriction on an 
assembly impacting public health. Thus, assemblies whose content contains 
a political theme related to democratic rights should, in fact, receive greater 
consideration. Content-neutrality is important in a different way: restrictions 
should be non-discriminatory for a political viewpoint, but content-neutral 
does not mean thematic content is irrelevant. In fact, restrictions that inter-
fere with political messages should have a higher level of scrutiny than re-
strictions that interfere with, for example, sporting events.
Some European countries have put the principles behind the OSCE 
Guidelines into practice as they regulate freedom of assembly during the 
391. See Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, supra note 363, § 3 at 17.
392. See ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 21.
393. See Fernandez, supra note 381 (advocating greater commercial reopening); c.f. 
Chicago v. Mosley 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (overturning ordinance permitting labor protests, 
but not school segregation complaints, near a school).
394. See infra Part VI.B.4.
395. See Chicago v. Mosley 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
396. See supra Part VI.B.1–2.
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COVID-19 crisis. For instance, Denmark’s COVID-19 response law is a 
best practice, as it includes exceptions for what it calls “opinion-shaping as-
semblies,” or those assemblies that might contribute to democratic debate.
397
Greenland’s law includes a similar exception.
398
Germany’s federal stay-at-
home order did not exempt political gatherings, but its Constitutional Court 
ruled that COVID-19-inspired limits on freedom of assembly were over-
broad and remanded a decision, allowing an anti-COVID-19 protest to go 
forward.
399
U.S. jurisprudence analyzing freedom of assembly reaches similar con-
clusions. In Cox v. New Hampshire, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that rea-
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions on a public assembly were law-
ful.
400
The Court ruled that interests in public safety, such as the orderly 
conduct of parades or other large gatherings, justified reasonable time, 
place, and manner restrictions on demonstrations by a group of Jehovah’s
witnesses.
401
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court in National Socialist 
Party of America v. Village of Skokie ruled that a government could not ban 
a public assembly simply because it contained images (in this case swasti-
kas) that a majority of citizens considered abhorrent.
402
This content neu-
trality rule was made clearest in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,
where the Supreme Court held the government, could not selectively ex-
clude speakers from the public sphere based on the content of their mes-
sage.
403
In that case, Earl Mosley was told by Chicago police he would be 
arrested if he continued picketing against segregation in Chicago public 
schools because of a Chicago ordinance banning all picketing, except for 
labor protests, within 150 meters of a school. The Court ultimately ruled 
that content and viewpoint neutrality was an essential requirement for oth-
erwise permitted time, place and manner restrictions on freedom of assem-
bly:
[G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to people whose 
views it finds acceptable but deny use to those wishing to express 
less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select 
which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities.
There is an “equality of status in the field of ideas,” and the gov-
ernment must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be 
heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some 
groups, the government may not prohibit others from assembling or 
397. See COVID Tracker, supra note 1 (searching “Denmark”).
398. See id. (searching “Greenland”).
399. See Kate Martyr, Top German Court: Coronavirus Restrictions Not Grounds to 
Ban All Protests, DEUTSCHE WELLE (April 4, 2020), https://p.dw.com/p/3b1kI.
400. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574–76 (1941).
401. Id.
402. Nat’l Socialist Party of America v. Vill. of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43 (1977).
403. Chicago v. Mosley 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
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speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selective exclu-
sions from a public forum may not be based on content alone and 
may not be justified by reference to content alone.
404
In May 2020, the Supreme Court upheld a California order closing 
churches and later limiting them to twenty-five percent capacity during the 
COVID-19 crisis.
405
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized 
the need for technical expertise in making “fact-intensive” decisions about 
stay-at-home-orders and underscored the non-discriminatory nature of limits 
placed on churches.
406
Finally, states adopting freedom of assembly restrictions because of 
COVID-19 should consider carefully the idea behind Section 3.5 of the 
OSCE guidelines focused on whether the message of an assembly is within 
“sight and sound” of the desired audience. This concept creates an appropri-
ate parallel to the “necessary in a democratic society” test because this sec-
tion of the OSCE guidelines considers the democratic nature of the messag-
es conveyed by a protest. So, for example, evaluating whether assemblies 
can continue to get across a message of democratic dissent or reach the au-
dience intended seems a more appropriate way to structure an assembly re-
striction than numerical limitations on gatherings largely applied to 
COVID-19. Like the ICCPR drafting body and the UN, the OSCE is as 
much a political as a legal body; perhaps this explains why its analysis cap-
tures the kind of ideological questions about democracy faced by the 
ICCPR’s drafters.
407
4. Offering and Protecting Alternatives to Assemblies, Including 
Online Options
Modern society’s online alternatives for peaceful assembly seem espe-
cially important to the evolution of legal tests applied to COVID-19-related 
restrictions under the ICCPR. Modern telecommunications tools offer a sim-
ilar new lens in considering whether a state’s restrictions are proportional or 
no more restrictive than required for their purpose. A world of Zoom, We-
bex, FaceTime, and other video-conferencing software has now made it 
404. Id. at 96.
405. See South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 
(2020) (Roberts, J. concurring).
406. Id.
407. The author has observed the political and legal nature of these bodies through par-
ticipation in sessions of the OSCE, the UN Human Rights Council and the UNGA’s Third 
Committee on matters related to freedom of assembly, including defending the U.S. position 
on policing of demonstrations by the “Occupy Movement” in the United States in 2011-12. 
See, e.g., Eric Richardson, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Intervention 
Regarding the ODIHR Report Monitoring of Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Selected 
OSCE Participating States, Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting on Freedom of As-
sembly and Association, (Nov. 8–9, 2012), https://www.osce.org/odihr/93722.
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possible for a range of public assemblies to take place in cyber-space. The 
existence of these online alternatives might make a restriction on public as-
semblies important to a democratic society more tolerable when balancing 
against public health interests.
If, however, limiting in-person gatherings defeats the public message or 
pressure that protestors intended to deliver through an assembly, then online 
alternatives do not necessarily make an otherwise overly restrictive ban on 
assembly into a lawful limitation. An online protest can simply be turned off 
or ignored, whereas a public demonstration in front of a capitol building is 
difficult to avoid. Thus, the OSCE Guidelines’ consideration of remaining 
within “sight and sound’ of the intended audience bear attention in deciding 
whether online alternatives to a public assembly are sufficient.
408
Interestingly for an analysis produced at the University of Michigan 
Law School, the United States’ first highly public objection to stay-at-home 
orders arose April 15, 2020, in Lansing, Michigan. There, hundreds stormed 
the state capitol to protest the continuation of a month-old stay-at-home or-
der in Michigan,
409
at the time facing the United States’ third-highest 
COVID-19 caseload.
410
The rationales deployed by protesters in Lansing 
varied. Some wanted to return to work.
411
Others expressed political animus 
toward the governor issuing the order, with some ultimately charged in a 
kidnapping plot which aimed to try her for treason.
412
Some protested that 
the definition of necessary businesses kept churches, gun shops, and garden 
centers from opening.
413
The Republican Speaker of Michigan’s House of 
Representatives tweeted:
“Non-essential in Michigan: Lawn care, construction, fishing if 
boating with a motor, realtors, buying seeds, home improvement 
equipment, and gardening supplies. Essential in Michigan: Mariju-
408. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, supra note 363, § 3.5.
409. See, e.g., Paul Egan & Kara Berg, Thousands Converge on Lansing to Protest 
Whitmer’s Stay Home Order, DET. FREE PRESS (Apr. 15, 2020, 7:25 PM) 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/04/15/lansing-capitol-protest-
michigan-stay-home-order/5136842002/.
410. E.g., Trip Gabriel & Jonathan Martin, Gretchen Whitmer Isn’t Backing Down, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/us/politics/gretchen-
whitmer-michigan-protests.html.
411. E.g., Sara Burnett, Michigan Militia Puts Armed Protest in the Spotlight,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/c04cc1df0c958053489bd24bb7fce93f.
412. E.g., Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs, Shaila Dewan & Kathleen Gray, FBI Says 
Michigan Anti-Government Group Plotted to Kidnap Gov. Gretchen Whitmer, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 8, 2020), Trip Gabriel & Jonathan Martin, Gretchen Whitmer Isn’t Backing Down, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/us/politics/gretchen-
whitmer-michigan-protests.html.
413. See, e.g., Jeremy W. Peters, How Abortions, Guns and Church Closings Made 
Coronavirus a Culture War, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020) https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/04/20/us/politics/coronavirus-protests-democrats-republicans.html.
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ana, lottery, and alcohol. Let’s be safe and reasonable. Right now, 
we’re not!”
414
A follow-up rally featured protesters toting automatic weapons seeking 
their right to return to work, shopping, and daily life.
415
The caricature of 
protesters wielding guns and blocking ambulances undermines the serious 
political debate about when and how to reopen U.S. states for business and 
the economic toll that long-term COVID-19-related closures could take. 
Moreover, in this case, the location of the public protest appears to have 
been essential to the democratic purpose of the protest and online alterna-
tives would seem inadequate. At the same time, online platforms clearly 
served as important vehicles for organizing the protest and for amplifying 
its message before, during, and after the event.
416
A Tennessee anti-
lockdown organizer who launched his movement on Zoom and Twitter said 
he started his protests because “if constitutional rights can be taken away 
whenever there is a crisis, they are not rights at all—they are permis-
sions.”
417
California’s COVID-19-related public notice is one best practice, as it 
specifically proposes alternatives to public gatherings as a means of political 
expression.
418
The website offers guidance about alternatives to organizing a 
protest and how to engage in political activity, including online and in-car 
protests, and exemptions for voting.
419
Among California’s practices that others might consider are: alterna-
tives to physical protests, online assemblies, wearing or displaying symbols, 
in-car protests, balloting by mail, and declaring an exception for activities 
(such as elections) deemed necessary to a democracy:
State agencies are not issuing permits for any gatherings—of any 
size, or any kind—at this time. Gatherings will be permitted again 
once public health officials determine they can be conducted in a 
manner consistent with public health and safety. In the meantime, 
please postpone or cancel your gathering and consider whether you 
can find alternative ways to host your event that do not require an 
414. Lee Chatfield (@LeeChatfield), TWITTER (Apr. 11, 2020, 10:08 AM), 
https://twitter.com/LeeChatfield/status/1248976304155869190.
415. Burnett, supra note 411.
416. See Grace Panetta, Trump Calls Protesters Who Carried Guns Into the Michigan 
Capitol ‘Very Good People’ and Says the Governor Should ‘Make a Deal’ With Them, BUS.
INSIDER (May 1, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-protestors-with-guns-in-
michigan-capitol-are-very-good-people-2020-5?r=US&IR=T.
417. Millicent Smith, How the Anti-Lockdown #FreeTN Movement was Launched,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.timesfreepress.com/news
/local/story/2020/apr/25/anti-lockdown-movement-tennessee/521545/.
418. Stay Home Q&A, CAL. ALL https://covid19.ca.gov/stay-home-except-for-essential-
needs/ (last updated Oct. 29, 2020, 4:29 PM).
419. Id.
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in-person, physical gathering . . . . There are many ways for you to 
express your political views without holding a physical, in-person 
gathering. For example, you may continue to call or write elected 
officials, write letters to the editor of news publications, display 
lawn or window signs, or use online and other electronic media (in-
cluding Zoom rooms, Twitter feeds, Facebook pages, and other dig-
ital forums) to express your views. Additionally, as noted above, 
you may leave your home as long as you do not gather with people 
who are not members of your household. When you are otherwise 
out in public, public health directives do not prevent you from en-
gaging in political expressions—such as by wearing or carrying a 
sign—as long as you do not hold a gathering of any size, and oth-
erwise maintain physical distancing. If collective action in physical 
space is important to you, consider whether you and other partici-
pants can safely protest from within your cars.
420
Unfortunately, some countries not only fail to propose online alterna-
tives when they restrict freedom of assembly but also use COVID-19 as a 
pretext to shut down the Internet altogether. If a state were to shut down In-
ternet access—as has been done by Indian authorities in Kashmir, by Bang-
ladeshi authorities in Rohingya migrant camps,
421
and by others– the lawful-
ness of such a move merits strict scrutiny for its negative impact on online 
alternatives to freedom of assembly and other rights.
422
In the first formal 
UN Special Rapporteur report about COVID-19,
423
the Special Rapporteur 
on Freedom of Expression emphasized the importance of online alternatives 
420. Id.
421. See Athar Parvaiz, Kashmir Internet Blackouts Hinder Health Services, Contact 
Tracing, REUTERS (May 19, 2020, 9:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-india-tech-trfn/kashmir-internet-blackouts-hinder-health-services-contact-tracing-
idUSKBN22W052; Bangladesh: End Internet Blackout to Protect Public Health of Rohingya 
Refugees and Host Communities, GLOB. JUST. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2020), 
http://www.globaljusticecenter.net/blog/19-publications/1239-bangladesh-end-internet-
blackout-to-protect-public-health-of-rohingya-refugees-and-host-communities; Phelim Kine, 
Internet Curbs on Rohingya Risk Wider Virus Outbreak, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., (Mar. 
30, 2020), https://phr.org/our-work/resources/internet-curbs-on-rohingya-risk-wider-virus-
outbreak/; UN Experts Concerned at Surge in Civilian Casualties in Northwest Myanmar Af-
ter Internet Shutdown, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”] (Feb. 18, 2020) 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25572&LangID=.
422. Joseph J. Amon & Margaret Wurth, A Virtual Roundtable on COVID-19 and Hu-
man Rights with Human Rights Watch Researchers, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Apr. 16, 2020) 
https://www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/a-virtual-roundtable-on-covid-19-and-human-rights-
with-human-rights-watch-staff/ (describing where the internet has been shut down as a tool of 
repression during COVID-19). But see Adi Radhakrishnan, COVID-19: Restricted Internet 
Impacts on Health in Kashmir, HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. (Apr. 15, 2020)  
https://www.hhrjournal.org/2020/04/covid-19-restricted-internet-impacts-on-health-in-
kashmir/ (describing what internet restrictions were in place prior to COVID-19)..
423. See Kaye, supra note 360, at 9.
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for all human rights. He also noted the devastating impact of Internet shut-
downs on the enjoyment of human rights during a pandemic:
Given the migration of all manner of essential services to online 
platforms, shutdowns not only restrict expression but also interfere 
with other fundamental rights (A/HRC/35/22, ¶ 15). In the context 
of the pandemic, it has been especially troubling to observe the 
continuation of several instances of Internet shutdowns. The most 
prominent has been the long-term disruption that the Government 
of India has imposed on Kashmir. . . . India has not been alone. The 
Government of Ethiopia imposed a shutdown of Internet services in 
the Oromia region at the beginning of 2020, reportedly promising 
only at the end of March to end the shutdown. Bangladesh imposed 
an Internet blackout affecting Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, 
prompting 50 organizations to call for a lifting of the blackout in 
the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. The persistence of Internet 
shutdowns in parts of Myanmar continues to be of serious concern, 
particularly in light of COVID-19. In other contexts, mandate hold-
ers have raised concerns related to Iraqi service disruptions. A 
growing number of shutdowns have been imposed during election 
periods, including in Cameroon, Chad, the Gambia, and Togo. Al-
most 200 Internet shutdowns of various varieties in 2018 have been 
documented, with almost two thirds occurring in India, and the re-
mainder occurring principally in Asia, the Middle East, and Afri-
ca.
424
The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Association and Assembly 
made similar points among “Ten Key Principles,” he announced in April 
2020.
425
Clearly, Internet shutdowns are at odds with the ICCPR requirement 
that restrictions are “necessary in a democratic society.” Of course, many 
societies who have imposed these restrictions are not democracies, although 
India is the world’s largest democracy and the country imposing the most 
Internet shutdowns.
426
The damage of Internet shutdowns underscores the 
importance of modernizing our limitations analysis to consider online alter-
natives not just for freedom of expression, but also for freedom of assembly 
424. Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
425. See Clément Voule, States Responses to Covid 19 Threat Should not Halt Free-
doms of Assembly and Association, OFF. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [“OHCHR”]
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
25788&LangID=E (emphasizing the importance of online assembly in principles 2, 5 and 7).
426. See Sage Chen & Berhan Taye, Targeted, Cut Off, and Left in the Dark: How In-
ternet Shutdowns Became an Even Greater Threat to Human Rights in 2019, ACCESSNOW,
(Feb. 24, 2020, 6:59 PM) https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton-2019-review/; Special Rappor-
teur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right of Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 
Freedom of Expression and Elections in the Digital Age Research Paper 1/2019  (June 2019).
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and other rights. If a state considers online alternatives in analyzing pro-
posed limitations, then the state should—as the Special Rapporteur sug-
gests—judge Internet shutdowns particularly harshly. It is almost impossi-
ble to imagine how an Internet shutdown would be “necessary in a 
democratic society” or justified under tests of necessity or proportionality.
427
5. Need to Rebalance once the Emergency Ends
Perhaps most important, states need a legally rigorous and transparent 
analysis of restrictions on IHRL principles like freedom of assembly, be-
cause any balancing analysis needs to be updated as the circumstances of 
the virus-related emergency change. In the case of freedom of assembly, if 
states simply decide that, because of the limited nature of Article 21, it is 
acceptable to limit assemblies for public health purposes, those societies 
could lose the built-in opportunity for reconsideration of emergency 
measures a derogation provides. The ICCPR framework for derogation in-
cludes the idea that measures should be time-limited and that restrictions 
should go away when the emergency resolves. But, if states justify re-
strictions based on a limitations analysis, the law provides no such oppor-
tunity for reconsideration. It remains essential that restrictions continue only 
for the duration of the emergency and that opportunities for public assem-
bly—particularly those related to political rights—are rapidly and compre-
hensively restored.
428
One core reason why states are encouraged to derogate 
under Article 4 rather than merely undertake a balancing test or limitations 
analysis is that restrictions, once put in place, often have inertia and momen-
tum that makes them difficult to remove.
Even if a rigorous balancing analysis prioritizes rights necessary in a 
democracy, the end of an emergency means that all rights should be re-
stored—including those that might not be considered necessary in a democ-
racy. For example, religious congregants certainly enjoy elements of their 
rights to religious freedom and free expression from in-person meetings, 
which may be impossible or less intense when done via online platforms. As 
a result, the existence of video conferencing and other distance technologies 
should not be a justification for eroding their freedom of assembly once an 
emergency ends. Delaying exercise of rights might be justifiable in a health 
emergency, but rights should not be forever limited just because a state con-
ducted a limitations analysis rather than following the clearly time-limited 
pathway of derogation. This is just one example of why full freedoms of 
427. We view Internet shutdowns as almost always unjustified in a “limitations”-based 
balancing analysis but acknowledge that extreme cases of online incitement or hate speech 
could allow a state to plausibly argue in favor of restricting the Internet when using a limita-
tions analysis and focusing on the non-discrimination requirement. This possibility highlights 
the article’s underlying theme—the advisability of derogation over limitation, with its tempo-
rary nature and its prohibition on derogations that undermine non-discrimination principles.
428. See, e.g., Sheeran supra note 30, at 544–46 (2013).
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peaceful assembly must be restored once the COVID-19 emergency has 
passed and why limitations analyses if deployed, must be reconsidered 
throughout the various phases of the epidemic.
VII. CONCLUSION
States must keep human rights at the forefront as they continue to re-
spond to the global health crisis caused by COVID-19. It is paramount that 
states maintain respect for the international legal system as a whole and the 
individuals protected by it. The ICCPR contemplates that in a time of a pub-
lic health emergency, states may restrict rights enshrined in the treaty in or-
der to respond to the crisis effectively. States should utilize these mecha-
nisms but need to be transparent about how they justify their actions. The 
Human Rights Committee should provide additional guidance about when 
states should move from using limitations to derogations as the preferred 
mechanism to implement restrictions. More rigorous limitations analysis by 
states should consider the phase of disease prevention at issue; prioritizing 
rights necessary in a democracy; and modern alternatives for promoting and 
protecting human rights, especially online alternatives; and privacy-
protecting technologies. Under either a derogation or a limitations analysis, 
states must recognize that restrictions need to be informed by experts out-
side of the law, especially in the fields of medicine, public health, and tech-
nology, in order to assess the substantive requirements of emergency 
measures adequately. Finally, states must ensure that emergency measures 
do not extend beyond the current crisis by assessing their temporality 
through the procedural requirements of derogation or the proportionality as-
sessment of a limitation analysis.
As the pandemic unfolds, we hope that states will thoroughly consider 
their international human rights obligations in implementing emergency 
measures and that this article has provided some best practices and other 
guidance on how states can improve their analysis and response to COVID-
19 in compliance with the ICCPR. Times of crisis provide the global com-
munity an opportunity to renew its commitment to human rights, and we 
hope that states will rise to the occasion.
